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This report is a collection of papers written for those who 
Are part of and familiar with the Fleet Battle Experiment 
Process. They value is limited for those who are not part 
of these experiments because context is not presented 
I. Introduction 
Any type of experimentation, to be successhl, requires a great deal of planning for capture of 
data and subsequent analyses. Both must be linked to a set of learning objectives. There is a 
progression of types of experiments, fi-om those that are s i p l e  to plan to those that tax the most 
ingenious minds. 
At one end is experimentation with physical systems in the laboratory, such as solid-state 
physics. The experiments can be very complex, requiring accurate instrumentation and a 
progression of detailed cause-and-effect measurements. However, one is dealing with a limited 
set of interactions and planning is reasonably straightforward. One comforting fact is that the 
experiments are repeatable, can be controlled, and statistical validity can be assured. 
Engineering systems are more diBcult to deal with by virtue of the fact that they are made up of 
many components, so the interactions are more complex, but one is still dealing with physical 
systems and the same comments as above apply. 
If one moves fi-om the laboratory to the field, experimentation becomes more dBcult. This is 
due to lack of control over the environment. Experimentation in fields such as meteorology and 
oceanography are inherently more difficult than physics, which is why it has taken much longer 
to accomplish accurate weather prediction than understand the behavior of electromagnetic 
waves. Repeatability in field environmental experiments means waiting for the right conditions 
to occur. 
If humans are a part of the experiment, control is veq dBcult. One has to develop means for 
accounting for the variability of human behavior, or set up environment controls within which 
human interactions can be investigated. Often one is attempting to determine the effectiveness 
of a physical system with which humans interact. Apportioning cause-and-effect between the 
humans and the system is then the challenge. 
Of course, if one is dealing with humans in the field, the most challenging experimental situation 
is encountered. Military field experiments where one is utilizing operating forces is perhaps the 
most dficult of all. A root cause is that one wishes to determine the effectiveness for executing 
military operations but it is not possible to reproduce a true warfare situation. A mixture of live- 
play and simulation is often a means used to inject as much realism into the experiment as 
possible. Since utilizing military objects: ships, aircraft, personnel, etc. is a very expensive 
proposition, many replications will most often not be achieved. 
In spite of these difficulties, military field experimentation is successhlly carried out. However, 
success depends critically on process. The purpose of this report is to document the process that 
has been developed for the Navy’s Fleet Battle Experiments (Fl3Es). The format is a set of 
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papers dealing with the topical areas that form the 111 process. They are essentially stand-alone 
documents which were written by the authors over a six-month period and are presented for the 
most part as they were written. This means that there is some overlap of concepts between them. 
A small mount of editing has been done to make the whole report a coherent document, but not 
much. 
The following diagram indicates characteristics of experiments and where FBEs fit within a 
spectrum of types of experiments. Note that the relative positions of the various characteristics 
along their vertical axes has no relational meaning. 
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The diagram shows the types of experiments and processes/systems one is dealing with as you 
move from unstructured, high-complexity experiments that are largely qualitative to those that 
are highly quantitative with well controlled structure. As the diagram shows, FBEs occupy a 
large part of the spectrum. This means that a high degree of planning is needed to insure that all 
of the varied objectives are met. 
The next section provides a brief explanation of the purpose of each document, and provides 
some glue for the whole. One can use these explanations as a guide to moving around through 
the documents, picking the ones of interest for examination. In general, the ordering of the 
sections moves from general concepts to specifics. 
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II. Section Descriptions 
As was stated above, this report is a series of papers. They have been arranged to progress from 
general requirements for experimentation to contributions to the transition of military forces to 
meet new requirements, to specific activities that are needed to carry out field experiments, to 
reporting of results. Starting at the beginning and reading to the end will present a complete 
picture, but many readers will wish to jump to specific topics. 
This Section contains short descriptions of each of the papers, which should act as a guide for the 
reader. Note that not all of the papers are independent. In some cases, a topic will be covered in 
more than one paper and no attempt has been made to combine them into a single section. Thus, 
some redundancy will be encountered, but not duplication of content, rather expansions or 
slightly different explanations of a point or process. 
Requirements for Orflanizations Engaged in Technology Products 
Organization literature has many case studies that discuss corporations operating in high 
technology and innovation environments. Successfbl aircraft companies, computer software 
companies, universities, etc., all have a similar component structure. This structure is presented 
and related to structural requirements for Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC). 
Developinn Initiatives 
FBEs are developed around a number of concepts (usually wide in scope) and initiatives (more 
targeted to needs). These result from discussion within NWDC and from Fleet concerns. The 
development of an experiment (apart from the execution of an exercise or other event in which 
an FBE may be conducted) depends greatly on this umbrella of concepts and the consequent set 
of an individual experiment’s initiatives. The process of developing initiatives is discussed. 
Constructing Data Plans 
A method is shown for identifjring experimental objectives (requirements for knowledge), 
defining capabilities that W l  those needs, and elements of data that are specific for data 
planning and execution. A rigorous data collection plan @CP) results from this method, and an 
opportunity to conduct analysis across the continuum of experimentation. 
Decomposing Learning Obiectives and Experiment Questions 
Learning objectives and questions to be addressed in an experiment are most often stated in 
broad terms. They must be treated as general guidelines from which specifics have to be 
derived. Decomposition and extracting specific objectives and questions for which experimental 
data can be obtained are described. 
Internal Consistencv (Fitness) in Experimentation 
Internal consistency between the various aspects of an experiment must be developed if the 
experiment is to produce results that are meaningfbl, of high quality, and address the experiment 
learning goals. A general discussion of the topic and examples are presented. 
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Process Status Chart 
Five parallel processes need to progress in order to construct a Fleet Battle Experiment data- 
capture plan. The steps in the process are described and a chart is presented for tracking 
progress. 
Concept Centered Experimentation and Analvsis 
Designing, executing, and analyzing Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE), and ensuring that results 
can be carried forward to future events, is a complex process. A robust process is needed that 
includes synergistic games, studies, exercises, etc. building on one another and leading to 
accepted and well documented results. This paper outlines a Concept Centered Experimentation 
and Analysis process for FBE formulation, planning, execution, and analysis. 
Knowledge Management Structure 
Fleet Battle Experiments generate large amounts of various types of information and data. Both 
must be archived in a way that allows easy extraction to perform various analyses. A multi-level 
tagging scheme is used to provide access to individual data elements. This allows building sets 
of tags to pull data that address specific question of study goals. The scheme for subjective data 
is described. 
Data Requirements 
Many types of data are needed to capture the full extent of Fleet Battle Experiment operations. 
One must gather information on processes, systems, human interactions with red-time 
information, bits and bytes flowing in electronic systems, etc. This paper describes the types of 
data and how they are gathered. 
Reoortinn Structure 
There are many customers for FBE results, some internal to the process, many external. The 
following notes several of the customers, the types of information they need, and the reporting 
structure that meets those needs. The reporting structure is supported by a synergistic 
information structure, which is also briefly described. 
Case Study Analysis 
Fleet Battle Experiments are not controlled experiments fiom which one can generate 
statistically significant results. Rather, they are vignettes from which one can observe a result 
for a set of circumstances. In essence, they are case studies, and what this implies for how 
results are reported is presented. 
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In addition to these papers by the authors, there are germane documents prepared by other 
authors which appear in appendices. They are: 
The Modular Command and Control Evaluation System 
The Military Operations Research Society has devised a methodology for evaluating Command 
and Control systems. An outline of the methodology is presented in this paper. The material is 
extracted from a summary by the Society 
Navy Maior-Caliber Ammunition Reliability Goals 
This paper describes data capture and analysis for the Navy 5 inch gun program. It is an 
excellent example of inductive analysis and reporting of results. 
Process for Determining Measures of Evaluation 
This section is a set of Power Point slides that outline a rigorous methodology for developing 
measures of performance and effectiveness. 
7 
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III. Requirements for Organizations Engaged in Technology Products 
Organizations engaged in high technology and discovery of innovation may be described in 
some generalized interactions. The components of these interactions are included in the diagram 
below. 
Organizations that are responsible for production of high technology or technical products (such 
as aircraft companies, computer s o h a r e  companies computer hardware companies and 
universities, to name just a few) all have a similar structure with at least these components. 
Generally there will be (not in any order), a Marketing division, a strategy or oversight 
organization, a research and development division that also will include some prototyping 
function, and a production division. Of course there are other components to these complex 
organizations that are not included here (such as a financial department, personnel, facilities etc) 
because they are less value to this discussion. 
The oval above marks the boundary of the "system" from the point of view of the organization. 
Somewhere beyond the boundary of the company is an "environment," which is actually a 
complex set of environments. The tendency is almost always to think of customers, competitors, 
problems and so forth as outside of the organization's boundaries, and as part of "the" 
environment. The result is there is often a great deal of ambiguity as to what the "environment" 
is to any one person within the organization, unless the organization has spent a great deal of 
time and effort to focus meanings of "environment." This has its own set of problems, because 
the collection within "environments" is very dynamic. For the rest of this discussion, 
"environment" is referred to in the collective sense. 
Within the boundaries of the organization (inside the oval), there is very often tension between 
“marketing” and “production.” One major reason for this results from marketing’s incentives. 
One of marketing’s roles is to assess and understand what impact the organization has on its 
targeted “environment,” and vice-versa. If marketing is responsible for directing the 
organization’s impact on the environment, it would imply that production and R&D is somehow 
responsive to marketing. However, it is generally true that R&D will lag behind marketing 
needs because marketing does not strategize the future of the organization. Strategizing is the 
role of the organization’s leadership, and although that leadership will acknowledge marketing’s 
needs, marketing will not be the central feature of the organization. Strategy’s job is difficult 
because of the resources that have to be continually coupled to the environment. Further system 
lag is created by the time it takes to produce prototypes or other products. The impact is felt on 
production, which is not directly responsible for R&D, marketing and strategy, but deeply 
coupled to all of them. 
Most organizations allow for a certain level of this tension, and try to use it to the organization’s 
best advantage. 
One outcome of this tension is that marketing, unable to get R&D and production to shift in 
order to meet changes in the environment (remember we are talking about a high tech company 
here--not making hamburgers-and even that endeavor has difficulties keeping up with market 
changes), will attempt to %pin” production’s efforts (the product) to make it appear to meet 
environment’s requirements. 
Of course there are many permutations to this set of dynamics and interactions. 
Experimentation as a Technology Organization 
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the environment. Lack of definition here contributes to 
conflict in the organization as a whole. This is evidenced by a pendulum swing between 
concerns for “innovation” to “impacting the acquisition process,” which has surfaced alongside 
of former discussions such as “value added to the operations personnel,” and “creating buy-in 
within the flag community.” All of these are meaningfbl to the organization, and are perhaps not 
without basis, but are also shifts to match perceptions of change in the larger environment 
described in the model above. The result is that the experimentation organization has tended to 
focus on one of these customer groups at a time, and at different times. Within each of these 
potential environments of interest, there is very little common agreement as to what exactly 
defines each. Without common definitions, it is difficult to combine efforts that result in desired 
impacts. 
A result of the swinging pendulum of priorities mentioned above is that there are impacts on core 
principles. While these may change, they do not change quickly. So, while the environment 
seems to demand one category of experimentation results (for example acquisition related data), 
the organization may have focused on innovation and will experience internal fiacturing of the 
means to produce a result for ambiguous ends. Carrying this example forward, while 
innovations research is hture oriented, marketing (responding to perceived need for results that 
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are useful to test and evaluations related to acquisitions programs) will not be very interested in 
designing for futures research and the focus will be much more on present planning. 
Marketing is not yet a core competency of experimentation organizations. There is very little 
formal assessment of environments, and little formal discussion above the anecdotal level of 
marketing needs. In other words, there tends to be a great deal of ambiguity about who the 
customers of experimentation are. 
Ambiguity and lack of marketing competency will produce a reliance on R&D and production to 
fill this void. For example, there could be pressure on R&D to create immediate relevance in 
what was once %novations research.” There will be multiple impacts throughout the 
organization dynamics as a result. 
Recommendations 
A “marketing” component needs to be included in experimentation that functions to articulate the 
multiple needs of complex environments and which can also evaluate changes in the 
environment and assist in integrating change within the rest of the organization. 
R&D must have a range of autonomy consistent with bctions of research and development. 
Prototypes always have one foot in grounded requirements and one foot in innovation (looking 
towards the next prototype). A good R&D function will also produce multiple prototypes that 
may or may not be directly mapped to marketing needs to impact the environment. 
1 1  
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IV. Developing Initiatives 
BACKGROUND 
FBEs are developed around a number of concepts (usually wide in scope) and initiatives (more 
targeted to needs). These result fiom discussion within NWDC (internal dialogue) and external 
Flag (Fleet) concerns. Concepts and initiatives have been problematic in the FBE planning and 
experiment definition processes, as they are generally not fblly formed at the beginning of an 
experiment planning process. Instead, concepts and initiatives are fleshed and solidified in 
parallel with the planning process. Yet, the development of an experiment (apart from the 
execution of an exercise or other event in which an FBE may be conducted) depends greatly on 
this umbrella of concepts and the consequent set of an individual experiments’ initiatives. 
Preceding FBEs that were not well defined in concept and supporting initiatives experienced 
excessive scope creep. Boundary definition is critical to planning, execution and data collection, 
and to final analysis. Freezing boundaries is especially important as the experiment draws closer 
to execution. If not properly defined, initiative efforts (the leads and technologies) will continue 
to define architectures up to execution. This creates ambiguous conditions for everything that 
follows. 
CONCEPTS-TO-INITIATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Initiatives generally begin as concepts at NWDC, or fiom Fleet concerns. Concepts are oRen 
vague, encompassing a much broader scope than can be engaged in one experiment. The model 
to date has been to loosely define a set of concepts (combining those of both “ D C  and the 
Fleet) on which there may or may not be consensus between NWDC and the Fleet. A Concept 
Development Conference (CDC) has been one means of negotiating experiment boundaries by 
defining “edges” to concepts and supporting initiatives, as well as a means to bring a third 
component (additional stakeholders) to the mix. Rather than providing structure to the process, 
the CDC has generally produced increased experiment (still a “project” at this time, and not an 
experiment) scope. This boundary may or may not have been reconsidered by the time the 
fourth component of the experiment process, technology, is added in a “technology conference.” 
There has been little or no opportunity to explicitly state what is proposed to be learned in this 
process. This cannot happen until the set of initiatives, technologies and experiment 
methodology are brought together to co-evolve the experiment. Instead, parallel processing with 
limited scope review has occurred in past experiments. This resulted in delays to ‘%eezing7’ each 
of the components (concept, initiative, technology) essential to final description of experiment 
architectures and analytic methodology. 
ITRATIVE PROCESS TO DEFINE INITIATIVES 
A lineage should exist between high level NWDCLFleet concerns (concepts and critical issues), 
and sub-initiatives, questions that are being answered or knowledge added to, experiment 
methodology, data definition, analysis and finally-learning. This is the experiment definition 
framework. 
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The first phase, developing the initiatives (critical issues) from wider concepts, requires that 
some iterative dialogue take place between NWDC and principle stakeholders. This dialogue 
may be improved by providing some structure to the experiment definition framework, which 
may then be used as the central point of discussion between experiment planners (NWDC) and 
fleet stakeholders. 
RECOMMENDATION 
For each concept, decompose to a principle initiative, sub initiatives and sets of impact 
statements: 
Concept: (define in general terms in a page or less) “Concept Papers” have been employed in 
previous experiment planning. However, these efforts have often been diluted by competing 
definitions of concept paper’s roles. It would be best to loosely describe what is meant in a 
concept, allowing focus to be developed in initiative and sub-initiative explanations. Concepts 
should be easily negotiated because their boundaries are necessarily ambiguous. Initiatives and 
sub-initiatives will require more definition, and therefore greater efforts to reach consensus. 
Example: At the concept level, “A common operational picture is the principle and most 
important means by which the CJTF gains situational awareness within the operational and 
tactical activities taking place within the battlespace, providing similar SA throughout the chain 
of command. As such the COP is most important to providing dynamic information that is 
scaleable and may be focused on specific needs within the battlespace. The COP is one, very 
important element of a FNC. It must have the properties of accuracy, timeliness and usefblness 
to each user.” 
Initiative: Provide a COP to the CJTF, Battle watch captains and each echelon of command that 
is capable of being focused on the specific needs of the commander in that echelon, dynamic to 
the battlespace, and which provides the SA necessary to deal with the range of requirements 
encountered at that level of command. 
Sub-initiative (1): Use of COP synchronization tools to provide requisite timeliness to the COP. 
The experimental question here arises fiom the complexity of information feeding the COP, 
which must be refieshed within the lowest dwell times of TCT, while also providing access to 
information about the battlespace at large. In addition, there is some ambiguity with regard to 
the ability of the tool to impact the COPS refreshing of incorrect or untimely information. 
Iteration of these concept-to-initiative descriptions means that they are shared between NWDC 
and the fleet stakeholder on a routine basis. If a CDC meeting is held, that meeting should be 
grounded in a set of fairly well defined concepts and initiatives. In other words, the CDC should 
be an information venue, not a negotiation of concepts and initiatives by a wider audience of 
competing interests. 
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IMPACTS ON FURTHER EXPERIMENT DEVELOPMENT 
As noted above, defining experiment boundaries is a critical requirement. This cannot occur 
without first defining concepts and initiatives. 
Supporting architectures should not be considered in these discussions. Concepts and initiatives 
should describe what is required, i.e., a set of needs. Architecture and experiment design follow, 
but need some definition rigor. 
To date, experiment definition below the level of concept and initiative has been continuously 
iterative, with little feedback to stakeholders or other experiment developers (technology 
providers, installers, M&S, data collection and analysis) unless they have been inside of the 
process directly. 
From concept and initiative development to experiment definition is a very wide gap. A first 
step across this gap is use of formal systems analysis tools to produce context, entity- 
relationship, andprocess views of what is being proposed. Employing this rigor will assist in 
creating “fitness” between conceptlinitiatives, architectures and experiment design. 
15 
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V. Constructing Data Plans 
Methodological fitness requires that experimental objectives (requirements for knowledge) imply 
capabilities to fblf~ll those needs, and related data elements. These data elements then  spec^ 
plans to acquire data and execution of that plan. A rigorous data collection plan @CP) results 
from data fitness and provides an opportunity to conduct analysis across the continuum (see the 
definition of experimentation continuum in this document) of experimentation. 
The means to construct fitness in complex experimentation follows, and is presented as a series 
of steps. 
PROCESS STEPS 
1. Construct a data matrix. 
First, experiment initiatives must be specified from the range of initiatives possible. (I) 
-----+ these initiatives imply a set of sub-initiatives (Iil,G,i3.. ) 
---+for each sub-initiative there are general questions (Q) possible, which define 
concept scope. 
Also, hrther refining this set of questions yields: 
---+experimentable questions (q1,2,3,) which represent focused experiment scope. 
These questions point to: 
---+data that satisfies requirements, e.g., answers a question. 
2. There is a continuum of activities in an FBE, which together create an “experiment.” This 
continuum generally includes elements of:  
0 Demonstrations 
0 Evaluation 
0 Innovation and exploration 





And each of these may be satisfied by one or more of a: 
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System data element (S) 
Technology data element (T) 
0 Process relationships (P) 
Evaluation MOE (M) 





3. From the above, a matrix is constructed for each q; . Cells are labeled according to required 
data element needs (again, these are related to the question being answered). 




4. Any combination of data requirements is possible, as defined in experiment scope and 
questions being asked. Next, it is necessary to specify the meanings for the various data 
element needs in each matrix. This is done by answering questions such as: 
Q1: Is the process defined? Is the architecture, C2 or technology interface complete? 
42: What experimental elements are available from technology included in the experiment? 
4 3 :  What evidence is there that a hnction is being performed? 
Q4: If the objective is an evaluation, what is the measure of performance? What evidence 
satisfies comparative intent of the measure of performance? 
5 .  It is now possible to write a questioddata element relationship. For each initiative (I): 
I-----+Q----+q-----.) Knowledge Data (KD) = S and P (cell 1,l above)---.) specific data 
(defined in questions above). 
EXAMPLE 
Initiative (I): Navy Fires 
Sub-Initiative (11): Joint Battle-space Management 
Definition: (multiple meanings) 11 1 Visibility to all participants throughout the battle- 
space with regard to movement, employment and availability of assets. 112 Dynamic 
responsibility for assets on targets, and deconfliction. 113 Employment of TACAIR via an 
EZC with LAWS hnctions and TIBS, coordinated with Joint Fires architecture and 
processes (4 dimension deconfliction). 
Q1. How is "visibility" integrated into the battlespace, and will it have a positive impact on the 
domain? 
q l  . What are data elements of "visibility?" 
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technical: all data elements are held within and available to decision systems. 
Refresh rates are acceptable to creating decisions within dwell times. Information 
is accurate. Data required: 
0 tracked data at specific nodes (event data resulting from a distinction being 
made that something in the environment is necessary to be part of a common 
data stream-may be a COP or may not). Data stream is included throughout 
the Fires Network. Nodes at LAWS, GISRS, JCSE, TES. 
Data streams accessible at all levels of the decision and weapons targeting 
command. 
Process Technology Function 
Demonstration S / P  T 
Evaluation 
Innovation P 
process: systems are able to use information. System components are identifiable. 
Decision rules are usefir1 and incorporate system information. 
Process data required include: 
Capability 
MOE 
0 Process to make distinctions in sensed environment that are/are not of interest. 
0 Process to share information between systems. 
q2. Data elements related to positive contribution. 
technical: battle-space information is interoperable with systems and processes 
that use the data. Identification of nodes at which this contribution would be 
noted. 
process: contributiodconstraint and relationship to other processes. 
42. How is "visibility" accomplished in general to all levels of the battlespace? 
Q3. I1 implies a COP function. 112 implies a requirement for a COP fbnction and 113 is a COP 
technical capability. In what process are these related? 
Just for example sake, the following matrix can be constructed with regard to Q1, ql: 
19 
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VI. Decomposing Learning Objectives and Experiment Questions 
LEARNING OBJECTIVES 
Learning objectives are the highest level consideration for an experiment. Consider two types of 
objectives: 
Time Sensitive Targeting - determine the ability to accomplish this task. 
C31 System - assess the systems performance. 
The first refers to a specific mission, the second to a support system. For each, a great deal of 
context is needed in order to understand how to implement the learning objective. For TST one 
needs to know such things as: 
weapon and sensor mix, 
opposition force lay-down, 
scenarios to test, 
operational objectives, etc. 
For C31 one needs to know such things as: 
command and decision making structure, 
system architecture, 
whether human decision making is considered, 
decisionhiormation threads being examined, etc. 
TST is a process that can be decomposed, and the learning objective has to be decomposed. 
“Ability” may refer to the 
rate of prosecution of targets, 
number of targets that can be simultaneously engaged, 
or both, plus other measures. 
Since TST is a process, it is decomposed into sub-processes, such as: 
Detect > Info Fusion > Recognize > Mensurate > 
> weapodtarget pair > Decide > Engage > BDA 
Two sub-processes are in bold because they involve human decision-making as a fbndamental 
part of the process and obtaining data about the process involves knowing the human state as 
well as bits and bytes type information. 
Obtaining information about a process normally requires gathering sub-process information in 
order to develop cause-and-effect relationships. It is seldom sufficient to determine only 
information about the total process. Thus, process decomposition and determining which sub- 
process data to gather to meet specific learning objectives is a central part of the planning 
process. 
Considering some of the above sub-processes, one can readily envision types of information that 
will be desired: 
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Detect - what is the detection efficiency? 
Mensuration - what quality images are needed in reference libraries? 
WeapodTarget Pairing - what fiaction of targets are not engaged because an appropriate TLE 
cannot be produced? 
Note that the results for the first and last questions can be expressed as numerical measures of 
performance. 
Note that each of theses areas of desired information were expressed as questions. It is often 
efficient to express information needs as questions. Question decomposition follows. 
EXPERIMENT QUESTIONS 
High-Level Questions begin the process of focussing the experimentation areas. The questions 
also illuminate the interests of the experiment sponsors, NWDC and the Fleet Commander. 
Moving to the next level of questions requires parallel development of information about 
architectures and scenarios. 
Each high-level question will normally be broken down into several sub-questions which are 
amenable to experimentation. Consider a series of progressively more explicit questions. 
1.  Can we accomplish our Time Critical Targeting mission? 
2. Does a centralized ISR desk in an FBE Cell improve our ability to prosecute TCTs? 
3. Can we engage Time Critical Targets within 10 rnin of first detection3 
4. what are the PTW-t mensuration times as a fbnction of target and environment. 
A data capture plan cannot be put in place for question 1 .  The question is broad and has the 
semantic difficulty that “accomplish” is not defined. However, the question can be posed to 
experts and their opinions can provide some information. 
Question 2 has a great deal of complexity. The word “improve” implies that comparison is to be 
made to a former state, the answer to which would require that baseline information exist or be 
developed. Ability is not a defined word in an experimental context. A measure is needed, such 
as a prosecution time, or perhaps the ability to discriminate targets from the background with a 
new process. The question is not amenable to experimentation as stated. Part of the experiment 
planning process is to take questions such as this and massage them into one or more 
experimentatable questions. 
Question 3 is a “good” question. It asks for a specific time parameter and defines the ends of the 
process across which time is to be measured. Data can be captured for this question. Actually, 
one might wish to put in place several measurements in order to capture the processing times for 
various portions of the system. Even though the question didn’t ask for a sub-system 
breakdown, setting up the data capture to allow it to be done would undoubtedly be usehl for 
future detailed analysis. 
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Question 4 is a sub-component of question 3 in that it refers to a specific part of the system. 
There is one fbrther consideration. One should specifL the configuration of the tactical system 
when the measurements are made. It is often the case that configurations change during an 
experiment, so a measurement has little meaning without a specification of ‘‘context”, the system 
state. 
SPECIFIC QUESTION DECOMPOSITION EXAMPLE 
Consider the following question with regard to time critical targeting: 
‘Determine a sufficient level of ISR information and automated 
fbsion capability that would permit engagement nodes to 
successhlly acquire, idente, mensurate, engage and provide 
initial Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on a target in support 
of maritime and land attack operations.” 
This question has many elements. In order to use it for experimentation and analysis design, it 
has to be decomposed. We have broken it down into the following elements: 
Basic Questions - needed information level 
needed automated fusion capability 
Context - Land Attack Operations 
Maritime Operations 





Battle Damage Assessment 
Information is needed during Maritime support for Land Attack Operations. The basic goals are 
to determine needed quantities, which is not a well-bounded learning objective since the 
requirement will depend on the magnitude of the threat. A better-posed objective would be to 
determine whether the capabilities being tested are sufficient (rather than what is needed which 
can be diflicult to determine) for a particular threat level. The reason for the difference in 
difficulty in determining needs and sufficiency is that one probably cannot determine needs ifthe 
system being used for the experiment is insufficient to the task. 
The question addresses several processes from which information is needed (he data nodes). The 
implication is that sufficiency is needed for all of these processes if the total system is to meet 
the requirement (a reasonable assumption). One has to determine both whether information can 
be collected from those nodes and how. 
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For this example, we look at the requirements for Automated Fusion data. Information is needed 
about each of the processes before data capture can be designed. Consider automated fusion. 
One needs information about: 
System architecture 
Sensors data characteristics 




We go further into the decomposition by considering the system architecture. Of course, the 
architecture has to be well defined before specific data-capture plans can be formulated. 
However, even with out that information, one can now link specific types of data to gather with 
the original questions, such as 
Is the bandwidth sufficient to transmit the required imagery information? 
This question must also be placed in context, now at a much more detailed level. Context 
information needed are: 
Number of targets per unit time 
Types of sensors (data streams generated) 
Each of the learning objectives can be decomposed in the same way. Fortunately, many of the 
decompositions will lead to some of the same data requirements, such as bandwidth. 
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VLI. Internal Consistency (Fitness) in Experimentation 
Philosophy, the first science, defines principles as “irreducible” and internally consistent 
statements which have no requirement for fbrther reduction and may be generalized over any 
subject area. If it is a principle, it doesn’t matter where the statement is applied-it wil fit. 
Internal consistency is a “principle” of experimentation. That is, it does not matter what kind of 
experimentation one is talking about, whether it is looking for new sub atomic particles, trying to 
understand an ecosystem, or learning fiom complex military systems. “Fitness,” the essence of 
internal consistency, is an absolute. That is, without it, experimentation fails to provide the 
logical relations to make it “science.” 
The canon of the philosophy of science is huge with regard to this topic, although the 
terminology varies from author to author. Still, the principle stands, and it is simply this: 
In order for an experiment to produce credible results there must be 
a chain of logic which connects 
what is to be learned, 
the means to learn it, and 
the environment in which the experiment is conducted, 
in such a way that biases may be surfaced so that they are observable 
and may be accounted for. 
Two schools emerged in western philosophy of science, both of which claimed to provide the 
conditions for experimentation under this basic principle. Empiricist philosophy holds that an 
objective experiment is possible, meaning that it is possible to design experiments in which the 
observer is not part of the bias. Much of western science was built on this principle, but which 
has also experienced a great deal of difficulty in quantum physics (where one would have 
expected the highest degree of empirical control). Here the observer was found to have a great 
deal of impact on the observations, a very confusing result for science of the 20& century. 
Experiential philosophy says the opposite: the observer and the observed are part of the same 
system. Understanding that system perspective has led to cybernetics and complex systems 
science. 
The reason for the above discussion is to make clear that there are distinctions in science about 
how science is to be performed. In the empiricist case, systems are not looked at as systems, but 
are purposely pulled apart to consider the smallest elements that would make up the system. 
This view has often worked well with experimentation at the phenomena level. Experiential 
science asks one to consider that it is relations between things, and not the things themselves that 
are important. This seems to work best at the complex systems level. 
The direct impact on complex experiment design is that regardless of one’s science philosophy, 
ensuring fitness between 
what is to be learned in an experiment, 
methodology to create the conditions for learning, 
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means for observing the distinctions that are the data the 
a set of logics that create “knowledge” that is “truthful” and related 
to the fbndamental notions the experiment was designed to explore. 
experiment is designed to surface, and 
Whether empirical, or experiential, the principle of internal coherence (fitness) has been applied 
in order to conduct meaningfid science. 
Application to complex experimentation 
Military experiments (e.g., Navy Fleet Battle Experiments--FBEs) are ‘‘complex” experiments. 
This label reflects a common (trivial) understanding of activities as being “complicated.” 
However, in experimentation complicated has a significant meaning, which is important. 
Complexity in experimentation refers to the notion of a continuum of experiment needs. 
Answering the question “what is expected to be learned fiom doing X,” is a necessary pre- 
condition for all that follows. For example: 
a) Testing and evaluating a piece of equipment or a technology is an experiment 
category (which is hndamentally different from phenomenological research). 
b) technology interaction testing, 
c) systems experimentation (a system here includes people, technology, 
processes, data flow and rule sets), and 
d) learning from systems of systems interactions. 
All of these categories are included in Fleet Battle Eiperiments. And, to make the final point 
here, these categories are interrelated in Fleet Battle Experiments. This means that standard 
empirical practices, while appropriate at technology levels of FBE experimentation, are not 
appropriate at the complex end of the experiment category continuum. In addition, experiential 
methods are not likely to be the means of acquiring knowledge at the technology T&E end of the 
continuum (except as human factors are included). 
Designing Experimentation Fitness 
It is necessary to develop experiments as a dialogue between the multiple needs of the categories 
included in the experiment. Experimentation fitness is the objective of this dialogue and should 
follow its own methodology. 
Establishing fitness is necessary both within an individual category of experiment, and across 
categories. Also, it is important to keep in mind that the experiment design process itself is also 
a “system.” This poses a new set of challenges to the experiment design team. A very well 
developed and grounded methodoIogy, which has been developed for systems work, is the 
Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) approach. A systems methodology to approach 
experiment design, includes project description, scope development, survey, analysis, design, 
implementation and support phases. 
Experimentation fitness requires that these phases (and milestones within them) are specifically 
articulated within the “experiment design system (planning),” ‘’knowledge definition and 
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acquisition system (data collection and analysis),” and at each level of the experiment continuum 
for which there is an articulated objective. 
In general this means that there must be a fit between what is to be learned and: 
Concepts (experiment theme or themes) 
0 Systems of systems (complex systems) necessary to providing the conditions to 
“experience” the concept 
0 Individual systems within complex systems 
0 Interrelations between systems 
0 Technology experiments and demonstrations 
0 Scenarios/events that are “played” 
Creating fitness therefore requires that the systems approach (SDLC) must include these 
considerations. Again, a “system” here refers to people, technology, processes, data flow and 
rule sets. 
The experimentation design system and the knowledge system must include the means to attain 











Defining concepts (themes) and freezing them. 
Developing experiment scope 
Defining what may be learned within this scope (scope must be constantly revisited to 
ensure this) 
Deciding what the signiticant questions are, and their fit to themes and scope-these 
must be frozen in the process. 
Explicitly stating the experimentable questions that are consistent with what is to be 
learned and experiment scope. 
Describing the explicit data set (this must be precise) 
Plan for means to acquire explicit data, and ensure means to conduct reduction and 
analysis. 
Compare data (post execution) with themes, objectives and explicit questions for 
coherence. 
Data reduction and analysis. 
Reporting and feedback to hrther system and experimentation design 
Imdications 
Failure to develop the correct fit in experimentation produces loose coupling between the 
experiment elements in the continuum of experiment categories, ambiguity in experiment scope, 
limited and ambiguous learning and low quality of feedback for development of hrther 
experimentation. Using a systems design approach across the continuum of experimentation 
types will assist in including notions of fitness within experimentation design, knowledge design 
and experiment execution. Coherence in complex experiments does not simply “emerge,” but is 
a design criteria. 
EXAMPLES 
The above lays down the principles of internal consistency in experimentation. The description 
was general, and necessarily somewhat esoteric. The following are simple examples to illustrate 
the principles. These examples only treat narrow aspects of fitness. Fitness across the full 
spectrum of an experiment is much more complicated than these examples illustrate. The 
desired illustrations are made by presenting examples of non-fitness. 
Fixing ExDeriment Conditions 
This is not an example but a general principle that has been alluded to above. It is not possible to 
insure fitness if experiment conditions are not fixed. There is a tendency in operational 
experiments to add systems or processes right up to shortly before an experiment begins. It may 
feel satisfjmg to try the latest gadget at the last moment, or to satisf) the emerging idea of a 
person of influence, but doing so prevents insuring a quality experiment. 
Time Critical Strike Capabilities 
Assume a learning objective to determine Xa new process allows rapid prosecution of TCTs. It 
may be that it is sufficient to determine if the process can work rapidly for a single target. Or, it 
may be that the goal is to determine the capability in a target rich, stressfbl environment. If the 
scenario is target poor, the first objective can be met but the second cannot. The goal and the 
scenario must be compatible. 
Flattened C2 Structure 
A goal of the experiment may be to test a distributed C2 system with the far-flung nodes given 
decision-making authority. If the Task-Force Commander is not comfortable allowing 
subordinate commanders to do independent decision making, and imposes restrictions such as 
command-by-negation, and imposes it frequently, no information may be obtained about the 
capabilities of the distributed C2 process. It may be that the problem with the experiment design 
was that the Commander was not provided with adequate situation awareness tools so that he 
could develop confidence in subordinates decisions, or it may be that he was not in agreement 
with this goal of the experiment. 
Effects Based Operations 
A goal could be to determine if an effects-based operation, with an effects coordination cell 
could save resources. If no near-real-time feedback is provided so that tactical effects can be 
monitored, it is not possible to suspend an operation and reallocate resources to achieve the 
hoped for efficiencies. This could be a problem with the information system or it could be lack 
of process planning so that all parts of the planninglexecution cycle could adjust rapidly to 
changing circumstances. 
Stimulated Plav vs Live Play 
When play is stimulated by a simulation, special circumstances arise. The simulation runs on a 
model, which contains a set of physical assumptions about the behavior of systems. These 
physical assumptions must also be compatible with experiment goals. For a simplistic example, 
it is not possible to determine the Pk of a weapon ifthat is a parameter of the model (it is pre- 
determined). On the other hand, if the overall Pk of a process is desired, the simulation can be an 
effective tool for providing targets and weapons effects for the process. 
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VIII. Process Status Chart 
Planning the data capture and analysis for a Fleet Battle Experiment is accomplished by five 
parallel, interdependent processes. Attached is a status chart that tracks the progress of those 
processes. The standard green, yellow, and red are used to indicate status. The following text 
provides an explanation of the processes and the various status blocks. Khe basic assumption 
here is that a completion of the tasks within each of these processes is required before data- 
capture and analysis plans can be pt in place. 
This chart is specifically designed for the data capture and analysis process. It is not meant to 
represent the status of any other part of planning the exercise. 
A chart is required for each of the initiatives in an experiment. The particular chart attached here 
is colored to show the current status of the Time Critical Targeting initiative. 
Process 1 is the control function. The objectives are established and detailed data and analysis 
plans put in place. The Initiative Lead controls the experiment planning though this process. 
Process 2 is the design of the operational and tactical play during the experiment. 
Process 3 is concerned with hardware systems, especially those that support C2 information 
management, dissemination, and display. 
Process 4 is the full set of C31 processes. It includes the decision processes and nodes, TTPs, 
and human interactions. 
Process 5 deals with the simulation stimulated part of the experiment play. It is concerned both 
with the stimulation of events and with the physical modeling within the simulation. 
Red Cell deals with the Red objects that will be played during the experiment: types, numbers, 
tactics, and locations. It is a process in its own right, but for diagrammatic convenience we show 
it as a supporting process for Play and Simulation. 
EXPLANATION OF STATUS BLOCKS 
The Chart blocks are colored when reporting experiment status. The meanings of the colors are: 
Green - sufficient information is available to develop detailed plans. 
Yellow - information incomplete, some preliminary planing can be done 
Red - insufficient information for planning 
Note that planning proceeds regardless of the status of these blocks, but cannot be completed 
until the processes are complete. 
Each diamond is a decision point dealing with a particular process and level of planning. If the 
decision is positive it means that the level of planning is complete and the content is acceptable 
with respect to development of the &ta and analysis plans. 
Decision Points 
29 
‘lead OK” means the Initiative Lead makes the decision. 
“Anal OK’ means that the analysis lead makes the decision. 
“Satisfl” is a collective decision. 
In all cases the decisions are made in collaboration with the concerned people in the process. 
The reason for Lead being designated in Process 1 is that a formal control mechanism is needed 
to insure the Lead’s goals are being addressed. The reason for Analysis being designated as 
primary for Processes 3,4, and 5 is that electronic data, simulation content, and C31 are tightly 
coupled to data capture planning. 
Areas of Interest are the general areas that will be addressed within an initiative, such as 
experimenting with the concept of an ISR desk within a Fires Support Element for TCT 
General Plans are the type of events that will be played. 
Svstems is the 111  set of hardware, including pipelines, that will be utilized. 
Experiment Learning Objectives are the broad areas within which information is desired, such as 
methods for accomplishing BDA or deconfliction, or timeline reduction. 
Note that the learning objectives require information about the systems and general play that are 
envisioned (dark arrows with octagonal labels). 
Scenarios are more detailed descriptions of the play, such as day 2 will be devoted to SEAD and 
S A M  sites will be attacked. It also contains such information as the number of sites and perhaps 
that pop-up TELs will be used included as TCTs. 
Development of the Scenarios requires information from the Red Cell, as shown. 
Note that the decision as to whether the Scenarios are satisfactory requires information from the 
Experiment Learning Objectives. 
MSELs are the detailed scripts for the play. They require more detailed Red Cell input. 
Note that it is logical to have iteration with other processes for MSEL development. This will 
undoubtedly occur, but it is not shown on this diagram because it is not a req+ment (albeit 
advisable) for development of the data and analysis plans. The same is true for many other 
iterations that could be shown in the diagram. 
Architecture is what systems will be in place and how they will be wired into a total system. No 
feedback is shown for architecture design in this chart because data and analysis @sign play 
little or no role. 
Simulation is used to stimulate non-live play and also to determine the effects of some actions. 
The important information about the simulation are the events that will be provided, how effects 
will be played, and the physical assumptions behind the underlying model. &ed Cell information 
is needed to determine what o b j ~ t s  and play sequences are needed in the simulation. 
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Stimulation by the simulation is a core part of the experiment. The decision about whether it will 
meet experiment objectives requires knowledge of the detailed questions being asked, shown in 
the chart as the dark arrow from Process 1. 
Note that the decision about whether Simulation meets requirements (Anal OK diamond) 
involves both the questions being asked ,and the simulation details. A crucialpoint here is that 
this is not a judgement of the simulation, but about whether the simulation and the detailed 
questions are mutually supportive. This is illustrated here by feedback from this decision point 
to both Simulation and Detailed Questions. 
Detailed Ouestions are designed to focus on the details of what information is to be extracted 
from the experiment. These questions, or statements of detailed objectives, determine which of 
the Data Elements, MOPs will be captured. 
Note in the chart the interplay between the questions, the simulation, and the C31 processes. 
C31 Process is the collection of command elements, C2 structure, decision processes, supporting 
information, perhaps stated in TTPs or CONOPS, perhaps not. It is highly interactive with the 
supporting architecture. 
There is a requirement that the questions being asked and the C31 Process be mutually 
supportive. Again, this is shown as feedback in the chart. 
Data Elements. MOPs is an extensive list of data that could be collected to support the goals of 
an initiative. The list includes measures that could be used to assess system performance. 
Electronic Data Capture is an essential element of an experiment. Its main function is to 
establish accurate timelines. The capture plan is a portion of the overall data capture plan. 
Data and Analvsis Plan is the detailed plan that includes what data, by what capture means, at 
which experiment nodes, and what information will be produced from analysis. 
Note that development of these plans requires information from all of the other processes. A key 
point is that the processes have to be frozen before the final plan can be produced. 
Develop MOEs At the same time as the detailed data and analysis plans are being developed, 
preliminary decisions can be made about what MOEs will be extracted from the data. 
Uncover MOEs During the course of the analysis, natural means for presenting results will 
emerge. This will expend the set of MOEs that is used. 




P1 an s 
Uncover kl 
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IX. Concept Centered Experimentation and Analysis 
Designing, executing, and analyzing Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs), and ensuring that results 
can be carried forward to future events, is a complex process. A robust process is needed that 
includes synergistic games, studies, exercises, etc. building on one another and leading to 
accepted and well documented results. This paper outlines a Concept Centered Experimentation 
and Analysis process for FBE formulation, planning, execution, and analysis. 
The processes described here are being put in place for FBEs but not for associated events. 
Learning through real-time innovation is an important part of these experiments and application 
of these processes will not restrict innovation, rather it is a principle of this paper that the 
inductive process developed through past FBEs be extended and nurtured in fbture experiments. 
Following these processes will result in the myriad processes and organizations involved in FBE 
planning, execution, and analysis being synchronized and that participants develop a deeper 
understanding of mutual needs and the overall requirements of each experiment. A higher 
degree of coordination between analysts and FBE planners will result, and coordination would 
actually be eased through a deeper mutual understanding of the FBE experiment system. 
The perspective taken here is analyses within the context of large systems of very complex 
technologies, interactions, and processes. It is possible (in fact nearly certain) that perspectives 
will differ depending on where an individual resides within the experiment system. What is 
offered here is a conceptual way in which these differing views may work together, retaining 
their differences, while adding to success of the whole. The structure outlined here is not new, it 
already exists. What is done is to identifl the components of the structure in such a way that a 
process that leads to quality, coordinated planning and analysis can be implemented. 
FBEs as a Multi-Lavered System of Processes: 
All aspects of this system, from concepts development through hardware systems utilization, are 
multi-layered. This implies that, at the highest level or layer, one is dealing with highly 
aggregated concepts and systems. As one goes to lower levels, detail increases, and the amount 
of information needed to represent or interact with a system increases greatly, often forcing one 
to deal with a single sub-system at a time. 
For FBE experimentation and analysis we suggest that a useful delineation is four conceptual 
layers: missions, operations methods, svstems solutions, and hardware solutions. The following 
section on concepts provides explanation of these four levels. 
From this analysis perspective, in planning analysis of a concept, it is important to ensure that all 
of the process steps, 
concept statement->conceptual MOEs->data capture-> 
data processing->analysis->MOEs->reporting, 
are well stxuctured, which enables both experimental objectives and analysis planning. Well 
structured means that one understands the levels of concepts, their sub-concepts, and ensures 
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appropriate corresponding levels for the other parts of the process. The importance of this 
cannot be overstressed since the level at which one is examining a concept strongly influences 
the data and analysis plans. E.g. if one is examining the Ring of Fire concept at the tactical level, 
it will be necessary to obtain data that identifies latencies in the C2 system, as well as many other 
measures that deal with the degree of success of a particular call for fires. Thus, one must insure 
that critical communication nodes and decision processes are sampled. Testing this same 
concept at another level will require a different data capture plan. 
Examination of Concepts: 
For our purposes a “concept” is defined to be: 
A description of a desired result of a military operation, or an 
operational method which can be tested through experzrneniaiion. 
This sounds simplistic, but the inclusion of “which can be tested” is demanding. The concept 
statement must enable a means of testing its validity or of evolving the concept into something 
operationally useful. The methodology used for testing the concept will depend on its level, e.g. 
a high level concept may have no specific MOEs and be testedexplored through a seminar game, 
while a hardware concept could involve experimentation or simulation to evaluate specific 
MOEs associated with its effectiveness in a tactical situation. 
There are several levels, or grouping of concepts. Understanding a particuIar concept’s level 
assists in developing an experimentation plan. The following four levels are suggested and some 
concepts to illustrate each are presented (with no associated concept statements). There is 
nothing sacrosanct about this particular grouping. We use it only to illustrate the type of 
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A general example of concept driven experimentation will be usefbl here. Consider the much 
agonized over concept of a Common Operating Picture (COP). A testable concept could be that 
a particular information set will lead to COP improvements which will improve execution of a 
particular mission. We now know the level of the concept through the scenario and specifics 
about the information being processed. We now decide whether we wish to test the information 
pipelines and displays or the decision processes, or both, which determines the data that needs to 
be captured. At the end of the experiment we can make subjective statements about the degree 
of success of the concept from evaluative statements from the operators. If the appropriate data 
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was captured, we can analytically determine MOEs, such as latencies and number of tracks 
processed. The final results can range from 
the concept doesn’t work and should be abandoned, to 
the following difficulties were encountered, these specific improvements should be made, 
and the concept tested again, to 
the concept is mature, and should be implemented or an acquisition program started. 
Scenarios: 
Concept testing is done within operational scenarios. Scenarios 1) set up an operational situation 
appropriate for the concept being tested, 2) establish a framework for expression of results 
(context), providing an understandable operational meaning, and 3) provide a means to 
differentiate the causal reasons for results variability as caused by changes in system 
components, OPSIT, procedures, etc. A rational cause-and-effect process would not be possible 
without well-defined scenarios. 
Scenario evolution is a natural part of concept evolution, responding to new operations 
understanding, systems introduction, etc. Evolution can be incremental so that results from one 
scenario can be mapped into another, thereby allowing identification of improvements causes. 
Using unrelated scenarios for each study makes it difficult to relate results from one event to 
another. Also, there are savings of effort by using the same, or closely related, scenarios for 
multiple studies. At the present time, we concentrate on the following scenarios: 
Efforts are ongoing within the experimentation community to identify commonality between the 
scenarios used for various activities, and even to modify scenarios to insure a higher degree of 
commonality. This will this will greatly facilitate relating results and a logical progression of 
concept evolution. 
FBEs Culebra DD2 1 -DRM Global 
Robust MOEs: 
The need for Measures of Effectiveness if one is to produce useful assessments is well 
understood. These measures have the following attributes: 
a. enable conclusions about the concept being tested 
b. warranted by assessment commissioners as valid measures 
c. information gathered during the event allows their determination. 
These simple attributes are often not met, leading to inconclusive results. Attribute (c) places 
demands on MOE development and experimentation design. It is possible to develop reasonable 
MOEs that cannot be determined from the data available during an event. MOE development 
should be iterative, with the data capture plan being checked to insure proper data will be 
available, and either the data plan or MOE being modified, $necessary. 
MOEs should be robust, valid for more than a single event or concept. Robustness allows 
tracking of results from one event to the next, enabling concept evolution and comparison of 
concepts. If MOEs are changed with time, it is important to record the changes made so that the 
relationship between past and present MOEs with respect to concept conclusions can be made. 
Robustness and broad applicability also make data capture and analysis easier. 
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There is sometimes confbsion concerning various types of measures, specifically MOPS, MOEs, 
and MOFEs. Measures of Performance are normally used to assess how well a system performs 
a design function, e.g. a processing time. They are sometimes confused with a Measure of 
Effectiveness, which addresses how effectively a system, or normally a system-of-systems, 
performs a higher level function. An example would be how effective a particular TCT process, 
including the hardware, humans, and TTPs are is in prosecuting targets. Measures of Force 
Effectiveness are very difficult to determine, or even to define. Of course, it deals with 
capabilities to carry out an operational mission, and requires knowledge of both own and 
opposition force objectives. 
Note that, in an above listing of process steps, we show conceptual MOEs in the initial stages of 
the process and also MOEs at the end. This is in recognition that proposed measures are an 
important part of the design process, but that the way results are best reported may not emerge 
until the final stage of results production. 
Successive ExDerimentation and Iteration: 
There is a tendency to treat major experiments as independent events which produce final results 
for a specific set of questions. But, FBEs concepts are broad and require a succession of 
experiments before obtaining final answers. We expect experimentation to lead to modification 
of many aspects of the operations concepts being tested over time. Concepts, procedures, 
systems, etc., will all be in evolution. This makes it important to have an analysis system which 
is robust and complete in MOEs, parameters produced, and information archiving. 
As has been noted above, all aspects of FBEs are multi-layered. This is also true of iteration. 
One must be prepared to iterate at many levels, for example: 
Iteration between concepts, MOEs, and the data capture plan will be 
required to ensure that requirements for an experiment will be met. 
At the end of an experiment, the results wil be used to modi@ concepts, 
and concept iteration will affect future experiments. 
The fleet involved in an experiment will have a set of exercise goals, which 
will be one of the drivers in defining an FBE. FBE results will mod@ operating 
procedures, which will lead to new Fleet requirements for experimentation. 
Advances in understanding procedures and systems needed to be successful with 
a concept will lead to new operational possibilities and scenarios iteration. 
One must insure that the FBE design and analysis process supports all of the needed feedback 
loops. Thus, results must be presented in such a way that they support multi-layered evolution, 
concepts, CONOPS, TTPs, doctrine, etc. 
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X. Knowledge Management Structure 
INTRODUCTION 
The term “Knowledge Management” is used here in the broadest sense. We refer to managing 
numerical values obtained fiom an automated collection system, human subjective opinions, 
synthesis results, results tailored to address specific long-range initiatives, etc. The challenge is 
to create a knowledge management, KM, system that enables archival, retrieval, and analysis. 
This paper describes a KM system that supports the analysis of military capabilities. 
The information to be archived in this system come from differing sources: studies, wargames, 
and field experiments. A characteristic of these events is their variability. They have neither a 
common structure nor a common core of assumptions. In fact, there is an overt desire to test a 
range of operational structures and situations so that even a given type of event, such as Fleet 
Battle Experiments, will have some of its conditions change fiom event to event. On the other 
hand, there is a desire to synthesize results from many events to obtain conclusions on current 
and future operational capabilities. This means that the KM system must be robust to changes in 
the configurations under which information is obtained and developed. 
The KM system must it support the strategic, operational, and tactical questions being addressed, 
or that may later be addressed, by the events. The system described here has been created 
specifically for Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs). Fortunately, FBEs are very broad in 
configuration and the issues they have supported development of the required KM system. 
Within DoD, there are a relatively small number of overarching concepts under consideration. 
For a high-level organizing structure, we use concepts such as: 
Joint Maritime Access Control (JMAC) 
Time Critical Targeting (TCT) 
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) 
Full Dimension Protection (FDP) 
Mine Counter Measures (MCM) 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
Common Operations Picture (COP) 
These are an illustration, not an all-inclusive list. They are important operational concepts that 
support multi-level questions, including high-level questions such as “should we operate in the 
littoral?”, “can we support widely dispersed troops ashore?”. 
The above concepts are not independent nor are they of the same type. JMAC is a strategic goal 
and TCT, TBMD, FDP, and MCM are operations needed in support of that goal. NCW is an 
information superiority concept which can aid or enable operations rather than a type of 
operation. COP is a needed tool within NCW. Even though there are structural differences 
between these ‘%oncepts7’, they are oRen treated as being at the same level when planning a 
complex event. This is not a problem as long as one recognizes the differences and sets up a KM 
structure which allows the proper relationships between them when analyzing the events. 
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Developing a KM system requires that there be an archiving methodology which supports the 
“thread pulling” method used for developing and retrieving information. When archiving we 
place several appropriate “tags” on each piece of data. (We are using the term data very broadly 
here). Information is retrieved by “pulling” on a set of tags, which we refer to as thread analysis. 
Thread analysis starts with a specific question, from which a set of tags is defined to pull the 
appropriate data. The data archive must be as robust as possible with respect to thread analysis 
for a wide range of questions, i.e., the system must be set up so that one can access every piece 
of data that has applicability to a given area of inquiry. This requires an extensive set of tags 
and several tags on each datum. If the tagging system is not set up wisely, the number of tags 
needed on a particular datum can get out of hand. We have found that the answer to this 
dilemma of the need to balance robustness and cumbersome tagging is to take an object oriented 
approach, which is described later in this document. 
Knowledge, information, data, regardless of the semantics used, occur in a hierarchy or at levels. 
There are no hard and fast rules for the number of levels and how they are defined. The number 
depends on the granularity desired for information. The definition depends on the specifics of 
the system being examined. In general, too many levels (fine grained) leads to an overly 
complex KM system which is arduous and time consuming to use. For our purposes, we prefer 
three levels. They are: 
Level-1 - objective and subjective data that directly address events (event data). 
Level-2 - conclusions concerning the performance of a system (system information). 
Level-3 - conclusions that address capabilities at the initiative level (results). 
Note that we are now discriminating between the terms data, information, and results. 
Level-1 data consists of event descriptions and the time at which events occur. Data can be 
obtained from an automated acquisition system or fiom an observer recording an occurrence. 
Data also includes observations of the status of systems, work-arounds, configuration changes, 
etc. that occur at a particular time. 
Level-2 information often is a subjective opinion, but it can also be a conclusion developed fiom 
Level-1 data. There is no time associated with them but they should be in the “context” of a 
particular operation, platform, command and control configuration, etc. These contexts can 
change with time. Context information is oRen referred to as “meta-data”. As noted above, 
Level-2 data refers to systems. “System” is not meant to apply only to hardware. It often will 
refer to a C2 system, and can also refer to a process. The only requirements for something to be 
called a system are that it be an identifiable entity and that the interrelationships between its 
components can be defined. One must also be able to identifjr the interactions between the 
system and its external world. 
Level-3 results will most often be pulled fiom Levels 1 and 2 through thread analysis. Expert 
opinion may also be directly inputted to the KM system database. When this is done, developing 
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supporting information from Levels 1 and 2 should be done or the validity of the results may be 
suspect. 
It is important to recognize that questions have levels in order to couple questions to the proper 
thread-pulling analysis from the KM system. Question levels are not the same as data levels, and 
the answer to a given question will usually require accessing more than one KM level. Examples 
most easily illustrate this. Consider two questions: 
1. Does a particular system (or method) shorten the TCT time line. 
2. Does a particular COP configuration aid in reducing the TCT time line. 
The first question is straightforward, and the answer requires pulling the appropriate Level-] 
data, in particular the times required to perform the various TCT processes. One requirement is 
that there be a performance baseline from which the comparison can be made if sense is to be 
made of “shorten”. The second question is more complex. Answering it can require that one 
pull data and information from Levels-1 and -2, then attempt to isolate the influence of the COP 
from other factors. The answers to these questions can provide KM system information and 
results at Levels-2 and-3. 
QUESTION, DATA-LEVEL, AND SYSTEM RELATIONSHIPS 
The purpose of the KM system is to support analysis of operational capabilities through the 
examination of processes and systems. Questions form the basis for analysis and are the key to 
reaching into the KM system. Information may be desired about a system that provides an end- 
to-end capability, or one of its subsystems. The question could concern the effectiveness of task 
performance, perhaps us ig  an MOE such as time, or it could be the value of a particular 
parameter, such as reliability. One must devise the three-level KM system, and the associated 
data tags, so that a wide diversity of questions can be supported. 
The relationships between and within KM system levels are important. A systematic 
methodology is needed to aggregate data in Level-1 into information for Level-2 There must be 
coherence between opinions inserted directly into Level-2 and the information pulled fiom 
Level-1 . The same is true for the relationships between Level-2 information and Level-3 results. 
Tags placed on information and data are the keys to accessing them. The analysis methodology 
that allows one to go from a question to the correct set of keys to obtain the desired answer must 
be logical, reasonably transparent, and fairly easy to use. The basic requirements for a viable 
data tagging scheme are that: 
there be an easy correspondence between questions 
addressed to a particular KM level and the tags, and 
there be a logical relationship between the tags for the three levels. 
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The relationships between the types of questions and the three KM Levels are fairly 
straightforward when one refers to the definition of the Levels given above. Where the various 
types of system information can be found and how that relates to questions is more complex. To 
illustrate we consider possible questions that address the two Levels. First, two Level-1 system 
questions: 
a. How long does it take fiom detection of a time critical target to the time when 
weapodtarget pairing is completed? 
b. How long does it take to perform target mensuration? 
Both are Level-1 questions because they refer to the value of a particular system parameter, time 
for both questions. The first time can be obtained by summing the processing times for the 
appropriate parts of the total system. It may be necessary to follow sets of events through the 
system to obtain the times, or the processing times may be archived. The second time is 
obtained by pulling data for the subsystem that performs mensuration. 
Second, consider two Level-2 questions: 
a. Does incorporation of an ISR desk to manage sensors improve the TCT process? 
b. Does an ISR desk improve the quality of forwarded target folders? 
Both are Level-2 questions because they do not ask for a parameter or MOE, but for information 
about system performance. The first question concerns a macro-process, TCT, and the second 
for a sub-process, target folders generation. 
It may be that the answers to the Level-2 questions can be obtained by reaching into only 
information in Level-2 or it may be necessary to also pull out some Level-1 data. Note that both 
questions contain the word “improve”. This implies that a comparison is needed between 
performing a process with and without and ISR desk, which means that somewhere there must be 
baseline, or without the desk, information. This means that information, or tags, must be present 
in the KM system that identifies the configurations that were in use when datahiormation were 
collected. The above examples illustrate that a fair amount of care is needed to relate questions 
and the tags. 
The fact that Level-2 data will contain subjective system information implies that the 
information will not make sense unless one has a good definition of what the system is. This is 
true, and especially important for C21 systems because they are in a near-continuous state of 
evolution. Thus, maps of the various C21 systems are required as supporting information for the 
data archive (accessed through tags on the data and information). In addition, there are many 
hardware and software differences between experiments, so that supporting configuration 
information and tags must also be included. 
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DATA TAGGING STRUCTURE 
The tagging structure must map in a fairly transparent way on the objects and events that make 
up military operations. The number of categories should be small to reduce complexity, and 
there should be no overlapping categories, which would create uncertainty in how to tag and 
make information retrieval difficult. These criteria can be accomplished by defining three 
categories: 
Things - objects, systems, or people that perform actions. 
Attributes - descriptions of the state or characteristics of things. 
Actions - activities that occurs at a particular time that change 
the state of a thing or are interactions between things. 
There are subtleties involved in using a simplified tagging structure of this type. For example, 
suppose the piece of information to be archived is an action taken by an object. The obvious tags 
are those that identi@ the object and the action taken. In addition, it is probably important to 
know the attributes of the object to place the information in the proper context. Thus tags fiom 
all three categories can be needed for the datum. Almost never will data be tagged with only one 
of the above categories. 
Within these three categories it is possible to identifl the sets of Things, Attributes, and Actions 
that will adequately describe military operations. They are: 
ThiIlES Attributes Actions 
Platform Status Transmit 
Sensor Mission Receive 
Weapon Location Detect 
Information Command Relation Decide 
C2 System Performance Command 
Assessment Node Workload Physical 




Some of these are obvious, some not, and examination of the lists could lead one to conclude 
some are downright strange. A fbll description of the underlying rationale is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but a few examples to illustrate the basic ideas are warranted. 
C2 system refers to the full system, whereas Command Node is 
an activity that issues commands, be it a single person or CIC. 
Physical refers to any physical action, such as fire or reposition. 
Command is the issuance of a command at its source. Transmit 
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refers to sending any information, including commands. 
A force is any size grouping of platforms. 
Workload refers to how much activity a thing has to perform and 
capacity is the current ability to carry out its activity. Capacity can 
also be physical, such as how many rounds in a magazine. 
Obviously, there are many sub-tags within each of these descriptors. There are types and 
identifiers, e.g. Platform includes a tag for the type, such as ship or airplane and the identification 
of the specific platform. Decide could be a decision to engage a target or it could be a decision 
made for BDA assessment. Data and information will have tags that identifjr where they fit 
within these categories. A given piece of data will have more than one tag, e.g. to tag sensor 
information being sent: sensor, platform, sensor type, location, sensor information, transmission. 
SYSTEM DEFINITION 
The purpose of this section is not to define the word system, but to indicate how one links a 
question or thread analysis to what one considers to be the system for the particular case. In 
much of what follows in this paper we use “sensor system” as the example, broadly defined to be 
all components and actions fiom the point at which a target is detected to the point at which 
weapodtarget pairing is accomplished. With this definition, one can list those fbnctions 
performed by this system: 
Sensor System Functions (Actions) 







At ISR Center 
Receive Data 
Fuse Data 
Interpret Data / Decide 
Assign Sensor 
Create Target Folder 
Send Folder 
Mensurate 
Nominate Target and Transmit 
The above assumes that there is some type of central fbnction, ISR Center, or more than one, that 
receives sensor information and acts on it. However, the listed functions are independent of the 
exact structure of the sensor system. The functions are shown in the order that data is developed 
by the system, starting with the sensor on a platform being moved into position, through 
detection and transmitting information, processing the information at an ISR site, and sending 
the final target nomination out of the system. 
Having defined the system, it is fairly easy to see the tags that would be attached to data for one 
of these functions. There would be significant number of meta-tags that identifjr the experiment, 
platform, and other context. Then there is the Sensor tag to identify the data as belonging to the 
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sensor class, followed by other tags to designate specifics, such as it refers to transmission of a 
command to the sensor platform from the ISR desk. 
A datum will have only one set of meta-tags, but it can have more than one set of system tags. 
For example, information probably will be associated with more than one system, such as the 
sensor system and the COP. Thus, tags appropriate to both will be present. This allows inter- 
system relationships to be examined. An example could be how a specific sensor control 
codguration contributes to an improved COP. 
LEVEL-3, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Level-3 results address capabilities at the operational level. Thus the tags will be derived from 
major operational concepts, such as: 
TCT Time Critical Targets 
STOM Ship to Objective Maneuver 
NCW Network Centric Warfare 
COP Common Operating Picture 
CAS Close Air Support 
Etc. 
These results will have been obtained from a single experimentation event or by synthesis of 
results from several events. In either case, the result in the database needs to have a tag that 
identifies the event(s). It is not only possible, but probable that information that applies to one 
concept can apply to one or more others. Thus the result will have tags for each of the concepts 
to which it applies. 
Many of the results will have been developed from information in Level-2 or even from data in 
Level-1 . It is important to identifjr the trail(s) through the data from which the result was 
developed. Tags are also used for this purpose. This allows one to access the supporting 
evidence for a result. 
The best way to understand the relationships between analysis, the data system structure, and the 
use of tags is to consider an example analysis question. The following is a constructed, 
rudimentary example of the process, presented as a set of logical steps. It illustrates a thread. 
Analysis Question: How well can we do TCT? (Note poorly constructed, broad question) 
Results Pull: Pull TCT tagged data from Level-3. 
B is not so good. 
Concurrent FDP and TCT with the same platform is difficult 
Etc. 
Results: A is good. 
These pulled results may be sufficient as-is or one may wish to use them as a starting point to 
explore more deeply. Then, one needs to ask a more in-depth, specific question and do another 
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information pull, probably from Level-2 and even Level-1 . Continuing with this example, 
assume the interest is in the concurrent FDP/TCT result. 
Analysis Question: What interaction between TCT and FDP reduces the ability to do TCT? 
Information Pull: Pull TCT and FDP tagged information from Level-2. 
Only pull information that has the same platform tag. 
Insufficient S A M  rounds 
TCT C2 configuration too slow for FDP 
Information: Difficulties with tube loading 
This information focuses one on one or several aspects of the problem. At this point a third (or 
more) analysis questions can be posed. In this way the thread of information is built up. 
3rd Pulls: Pull the connected C2, weapon system, sensor system: 
information from Level-2, and 
data from Level- 1. 
Other iterations in the process will occur until the analyst is satisfied with the information or 
there is nothing new to be found. A result of this analysis may be to create new results and 
information, and archive them with the appropriate tags. 
The above example focuses on using the database for analysis, starting with results that are 
already in Level-3. In order to have results in Level-3, analyses may have already been done. It 
is also possible that the results were inserted directly from expert observations made during an 
experiment. This introduces the need for two types of tags for Level-3 results. If the result has 
been inserted, the tags will identify the concept and whatever context is needed. If the result 
comes fiom analysis, it is necessary to identifjr the thread, for which a tag is needed. 
The above analysis example started with an analysis question, accessing a result that already 
existed, then drilling down into Levels 2 and 1. Because of the result accessed, the drilling down 
began with looking for instances of TCT and FTP on the same platform. The example ignored 
the fact that the result was already present, and that thread paths already existed, in order to 
illustrate the analysis process. 
LEVEL-2, SYSTEM INFORMATION TAGGING 
Analysis begins with a question, then assembling the appropriate tags to pull the thread. 
Assuming that one wishes to generate new results, the pull will be fiom Levels-2 and 1 .  The 
following two sections describe the tagging schemes for these two levels. 
Level-2 will contain much context meta-data. Examples are: 
Event identifier 
Operation or MESL within the event 
Type of operation being examined 
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.--.  . . . . . . 
Description of the specific C31 structure 
Descriptions of the specific hardware and software systems 
With each datum in Level-2 there will be tags identifling the associated meta-data. 
Level-2 information deals with system capabilities. A example of defining a system was 
presented above using generic sensor as the example. It illustrates the many subsystems that 
make up the total system. Level-2 information can be for a system, subsystem, or combination 
of subsystems, as illustrated in the following diagram. Also illustrated is that archived 
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Recall that the data tagging structure has three categories: Things, Attributes, and Actions. For 
Level-2 information, actually for all data, the Things category tagging is natural. It consists of 
identifig the system itself and those things on which it sits. Attributes is also natural. The 
information can be a status report made at a particular time, what the mission is, the workflow, 
etc., and it can include more than one attribute in a single data entry. Actions at this level are 
more subtle as a category. At Level-2, Actions refers to information about system performance 
when an Action is being perfbrmed. Reporting on the status of a communication system might 
be that it is down. Reporting on its Action might be that the data rate is too slow for a particular 
peak load. Such information can be time marked, can refer to a time period, or may have no time 
associated with it being a general capability comment. 
LEVEL-1, DATA TAGGING 
The distinctive characteristic of Level-1 data is that it contains events that occur at a specific 
time. Event data can be subjective or objective. Examples are: 
Objective: a target folder being sent to the fires cell, or 
a STOW simulation target inject, 
Subjective: an observation or an opinion, such as 
an assessment node becoming overloaded. 
Subjective opinions are needed in Level-1. An example shows the importance of doing so. Take 
the case of an observation that an assessment node is overloaded. There may be available for 
that time period objective data that three sensor hits arrived at the node within a five minute 
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period. Combining the subjective and objective data allows one to draw the conclusion that this 
node becomes overloaded if more than two targets are to be processed within a 10 min time 
period. This conclusion could be a Level-2 datum entry for the system. 
There is little difference in the tagging for Levels-1 and -2. Event time is unique to Level-1, and 
Level-1 will always deal with an action, and be so tagged, while most information in Level-2 
does not. 
A better understanding of tagging at the two lower Levels of datdinformation can be obtained 
through examples. The sensor system is again the example. Thus, the “sensor system” tag is 
understood to be attached. We only list the specific tags for that data, not all the context tags, 
such as platform and sensor type. 
Data or Information Partial Tags 
Level-1 data: Time to create folder Decide, GISRS-M Terminal 
Time to mensurate Decide, PTW+ Terminal, Target Type, 
Physical Environment 
Target info transmission Information, Target-Information, 
Transmit, E-mail 
Time for weapodtarget pairing Decide, LAWS Terminal, 
Fires Cell configuration reference 
Level-2 info: “The fires cell codiguration TCT, Latency, COP(?), 
sigdicantly reduces the TCT 
timeline when compared to a 
baseline configuration.” analysis thread reference 
Fires Cell configuration reference, 
person entering opinion or 
This conclusion could have been produced directly by an observer or by accessing the noted 
Level-1 data. If it came from the Level-ldata, perhaps from that data referred to in this example, 
then a better Level-2 statement and tagging would be: 
Level-2 info: “The use of GISRS-M, PTW+, TCT, Latency, JFE Cell, 
configuration improved analysis thread reference 
the TCT timeline.” 
and LAWS in a JFE Cell LAWS, GISRS-M, PTW+ 
The following is a constructed example of Level-2 information at the subsystem level. 
Level-2 info: “TARPS-CD imagery did not TARPS-CD, Detect, Target Type, 
have sufficient resolution” TCT, Environment, Location 
If the observer logged a time at which this observation was recorded, it could be possible to 
correlate it with Level- 1 data concerning an actual target, sensor status, etc. 
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XI. Data/Information Requirements 
Many types of data and information are required in order to analyze successfidly FBEs. 
The types of data needed and where they are obtained are listed here. Note that some types of 
data are obtained fiom multiple sources. Also presented is some perspective on the Navy 










System and sub-system performance 
Expert opinions on web data collection 
Post experiment interviews 
Analysis of electronic data 
Process capabilities 
Expert opinions on web data collection 
Post experiment interviews 
Analysis of electronic data 
Observer evaluations 
Evaluation of experiment results 
Post experiment interviews 
Analysis 
Experiment results implementations 
Interviews with the Fleet 
The first two types are basic data. They are records of specific events that occur at specific 
times. Communication logs also provide context information. The next two deal with the 
performance of systems and processes. This information is both collected and produced by 
analysis. Evaluation of experiment results is obtained fiom expert opinions and from in-depth 
analysis of all the data and information gathered during the experiment. Implementation refers 
to what operational forces do with the results of an experiment. 
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DATARNFORMATION CAPTURE MECHANISMS 
There are five mechanisms for obtaining data and information. 
electronically capture the bits and bytes within the system 
an expert observer team 
observation inputs to the NWDC website 
post-experiment interviews with operators 
post-experiment workshops 
analysis 
Analysis will not be discussed here. It is included only to indicate that some levels of 
information are developed through analysis of lower-level data and information. This is covered 
some in the next section on reporting. 
Electronic Data 
Electronic data must be available if one is to quantifi, and even unravel, C31 timelines. One 
cannot develop numerical MOEs Without them. For those who believe this can be done, the 
awlkl truth is revealed when opinion is compared to LAWS data. By electronic data is meant the 
information flow through the various electronic hardware systems, such as: 
LAWS PTW COP 
GISRS GCCS etc. 
STOW JCSE 
Within each of these systems there are processes. We need to capture ALL of the processes that 
are part of creating decisions. For example, mensuration often requires use of reference imagery. 
When the operator accesses the reference image library, that is an event that needs to be 
recorded. We need not only the time that particular type of event occurred, but also what type of 
data was pulled. Of course, we need all information injects from STOW. 
Website 
NWDC has developed a website to collect in close to real-time observations from the operators 
in the experiment. The information is over a wide range of topics, such as: 
specific system performance 
need for enhanced communication means 
process performance and improvements suggestions 
work-arounds to achieve success 
usehlness of situational awareness displays 
etc. 
All of the information provided is colored by human opinion. This does not mean that it is 
invalid or of low value. It is of high value because an FE3E is a human-in-the-loop experiment 
and human opinions as they carry out the operation are an important component of the overall 
system. Even so, one must synthesize these opinions with each other and with data to check 
their validity and to provide context. 
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Post-Experiment Interviews 
Interviews with operators are the same type of information as obtained on the website. However, 
the provide an integration across the whole of the experiment. The perspective is different than 
obtained fiom the on-the-spot opinions. Also, the interviews are carefblly structured to obtain 
information that applies to the learning objectives of the experiment. 
Post Experiment Workshop 
After the experiment, workshops are held with Experiment Leads and system operators to obtain 
their perspective on the experiment. This generates a great deal of valuable context information. 
It is also the first synthesis step in the analysis process. Special circumstances are revealed, such 
as a system that was performing abnormally during a particular time, or that a particular process 
used had a particular effect. Those who operated systems such as LAWS and GISRS have a 
unique perspective. 
Navy Lessons Learned 
A mandated part of Fleet exercises is to report into the NLL system. The data needed for FBE 
analysis cannot be obtained from NLL as it is currently configured. There is no chance to 
modify NLL to provide what is needed, and that it is not even desirable to do so. Thus, soas to 
not cause extra effort for the operators, NLL input should be provided by extraction fiom the 
experiment data collection. The best chance to do this is with the website collection. 
Expert Observer Team 
A 30-40 person expert observer team is fielded for each FBE. Their purpose is to gather event 
data at pre-specified sites that are important nodes in the C31 system. Operator logs and chat 
records provide additional information of the same type. 
In addition to the simple occurrence of an event, the observer also provide context. For example, 
the observation that an operator was overloaded at the time of the event. Such context is 
valuable to unraveling cause-and-effect relationships. 
The following are the directions and an example of the data logging sheets that are used by the 
observers. At the end of each day, the data and information on these sheets are inputted to Excel1 
spreadsheets and transmitted to a central data archive. 
EXPERT OBSERVER FORMS AND DIRECTIONS 
Event Data Logim Sheet Directions 
Purpose: 
you need to do is record your observation or opinion, the time, and perhaps check a couple of 
boxes that identify the type of observation you are making. 
The purpose of these sheets is to make it easier to record your observations. All 
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Data: The data is your recorded observation and the time. All other things that are checked on 
the sheet are context for your data. Of course, this context is quite important so the more 
complete you are the more usefbl your data will be. 
Context: The following diagram explains the things we wish to have recorded. 
Information 

















This is not meant to imply that only those things listed 
are to be recorded. They are examples. You record 
those things your experience tells you are important. 
The above is quite simplistic, but with such information from many locations cause and effect 
can be traced through the system 
Data Sheets 
The following data sheet is to be used to record you observations. The basic data are your 
observations. BE COMPLETE. RECORD ANYTHING YOU THINK MIGHT BE 
PERTINENT TO UNRAVELING WHAT IS HAPPENING. The meaning of the various entries 
follows: 
Data Logger: Your name 
Specific Location: The platform you are on and the observation location on that platform 
MSEL: Identifjl the operation that is occurring. 
Time: This is the time of the observatiodevent, not the time the sheet is filled out. 
Your DatdObservation: This is the data you wish to enter 
Track ID: In many cases you will be recording events that are associated with targets. Be sure 
to capture and record the target ID. 
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The remaining columns on the sheet are simple check blocks. You check a block to indicate the 
type of data you are entering. This is an aid to archiving data in the knowledge management 
system. The checks will ultimately become tags for the data in that system. If you don’t know 
which block is appropriate, don’t check any. Note that there is an other column. Feel free to 
invent any tag you feel is appropriate. 
I I 
Information: Many events deal with information and we need to track what is happening with 
information processing and dissemination. In your observation column you will identifl the type 
of information. 
Dev: The person at the observation location is developing or interpreting information. 
Rec: Information is being received (in your observation also record from where, if-possible) 
Sent: Information is being sent to another location (record to where, if possible) 
I I I I 
Command: Commands are a specific type of information and we need to identify them. You 
will record in the observation column what the command is. 
Sent: Command is sent (record to where, if possible) 
Received: Command received (record from where, if possible) 
Status: Often systems, people, or processes are not working or have some special status. The 
data here is the status and which system. 
Phys: A physical system such as a terminal or communications. 
Peop: The person(s) at your observation point, such as overloaded, tired, comprehending, etc. 
Cmnd: Command and control process functions. 
Other: This is yours to invent. You may observe a pattern that you feel should be a category. 
FBE-F Data Logging Sheet (FBE-data-JFC) 
JFC INFORMATION DATA Data Logger 
Comments: 
Specific Location MESL Date 
Please note: Your recording events is very important. Also, you are the only source of human 
condition context information. This is an important part of understanding the C31 system. 
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The following figure shows the structure for archiving the various types of data and information 
that are acquired in FBEs. It also shows some of the reporting that is done, which is covered 









- - - - - - - - 
L 





NWJ QuickLook . 
Repor Report 
A i 
I I I synthesize 
7 
Electronic 1 Data I-’ 
u



















XII. Reporting Structure 
A B C D E ...... 
There are many customers for FBE results, some internal to the process, many external. The 
following notes several of the customers, the types of information they need, and the reporting 
structure that meets those needs. The reporting structure is supported by a synergistic 
information structure, which is also briefly described. 
Reported Results 
The customers and the reporting venues that meet their needs follows. This list is rough and not 
complete; it is only meant to indicate some reporting structure. 
--- hyperlinks 
Numbered Fleets 
Plans and Programs Offices 
NWDC Direct Customers 
a b c d e ...... 
NWDC FBE Report 
Cross FBE Long-Range Analysis Reports 
Presentations and Briefs 
Supporting Information for Result D 
MBC LWA FBE Report 
NWDC Concepts, Doctrine Cross FBE Long-Range Analysis Reports 
x v z D t ...... 
J9, CHENG, BMDO Tailored Reports 
Supporting Information for Result A 
DoD world NWDC website 
IJWA web site 
Underlying this reporting is the knowledge system, which has a structure that supports the above. 
Also, note that the two websites have corresponding structures. This is indicated in what 
follows. It is important to realize that putting these structures in place is an evolving process. 
Also, the following structures are general and do not show the complexity that has to exist in the 
final products. 
NWDC Website Reporting System 
This Website provides access to a range of results through HTML links. At the top level one has 
synthesized results which address major concepts and initiatives. Below that is a level of 
supporting information so that a person who has interest can “drill down” and see the 
information on which a result was based. The system is deterministic, meaning that the links and 
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supporting information are fixed. The person browsing is not able to query a body of 
information to conduct his own studies. 
b 
I f  
The NPS/WWA analysis informatioddata base is constructed differently. There are no 
predetermined links joining information and data at the various levels. Rather there are 
predetermined data tags so that data and information which are appropriate to a particular 
question or analysis can be accessed and assembled. A robust tagging scheme, not one that is 
focused on a particular experiment or analysis is necessary because questions will change with 
time as knowledge is accumulated and as needs change. Segmentation of data and information 






IJWA Three-Level Analysis Database and System 
T t -  
Current Results Set with Initiative Tags 
data-tag links--- bold pulled to 11, italicized to V 
with System Tags 
and Meta-Tags 
l a  
data-tag links --- 
i 
xi 
bold pulled to q, italicized to z 
zx Event Data, 
ii time marked 
vii with Event Tags 
I I 111 I I 
xci and System Tags 
Links between results at the top level and information and data at the lower levels are not fixed. 
A change in a top-level question can modify the tags used, which modifies the data accessed. 
New data will be added to the system as new experiments and events are conducted. When this 
occurs it may be necessary to do a new information pull for a given question to update results. 
A requirement for the analysis database is that it support the NWDC Website reporting system. 
There will be a direct correspondence between Website reporting and some of the KM system’s 
top-level results. In addition, some of the information that is in the second level of the Website 
system will be provided by the KM system, along with the hyperlinks to access the information. 
In addition to the results forwarded to the website, the KM system will contain results for 
specific concepts, doctrine issues, and possibly TTPs. This will necessarily be true to support all 
of the customers noted above. A requirement for all reporting is to insure consistency between 
the results reported out to the various customers and by various products. 
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An important question is whether there should be a direct link between the Website reporting and 
the KM systems. Doing so could enable a person probing the NWDC results page to reach 
directly into the KM database. We believe this should not be done. Reaching into the KM 
system properly requires extensive knowledge about the data tagging methodology, how to 
assemble a collection of tags to extract information concerning a specific question. It is probably 
beyond the scope of the results page to provide such knowledge. There is the danger that a 
person can use tags incorrectly and pull inappropriate or incomplete information, compromising 
their confidence in the displayed results. 
The combination of the Website and the KM system does for us provides the following: 
The Website provides a wide audience easy access to principal results. 
The Website structure also provides easy access to information 
that supports the results. 
The KM system provides a large body of information to warrant the 
validity of reported results. 
The KM system provides a means for archiving and correlating information 
for multiple events, synthesizing results for initiative progress. 
The KM system provides allows one to correlate information whose relationships 
are not easily accessible, revealing new and perhaps unexpected factors. 
The KM system allows one to link a wide variety of inquiries to all related factors 
which must be considered in reaching a conclusion. 
IJWA REPORT TO NWDC AND NWDC FINAL REPORT 
Two principal reports are produced for an FBE. IJWA reports analysis results to NWDC, which 
then reports the official results for the experiment. The basic content and structure of these 
reports are: 
FBE Analysis Report 
contains results fiom analysis of basic data and information 
is organized along systems and process lines 
structure enables extraction of results for fbture studies 
FBE Final Report 
contains an Executive Summary of principal results 
is organized along initiative lines 
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The following diagram illustrates the relationships between these reports and the associated data 
and information. Note the correspondence between this and the levels described for the 
knowledge management system. 
Marketing Material I } NWDCproduces 
A B  C D  
t
Principle Results 
A B C 
NWDC 
IJWA 
+ I> FinalReport 
IJWA I$ AnalysisReport d e Other Studies \. f Synthesized 
\g Information 
The arrows are included to indicate that information developed from the analysis process 
(synthesized information) is brought together to produce the final principal results. This 
information is also used to develop results for other studies. It is also apparent from the figure 
that the structures of the principal results and the synthesized information are not the same. 
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Measured data are of many types: e.g. pure numbers (or fractions), time is often an important 
parameter, etc. These measured values are data elements from which information is developed, 
including MOEs. Here, for simplicity, we consider a particular Time of interest. Related data 
are needed for analysis, and we refer to this simply as Conditions. 
The figure shows that parameters have ranges of values, which were measured for Number and 
Time, and which were recorded by some means for Conditions. Number and Time data can be 
manipulated mathematically, such as calculating an average. Conditions are manipulated in 
various ways depending on what they represent, in this case grouped into categories. 
Number and Time can be processed into averages, and the extremes are known. What should be 
reported to convey capabilities? Time extremes might be very important and worth reporting, 
average time probably doesn’t convey much information. One could use any of these numbers 
as an MOE, but it is questionable whether they are measures of operational “effectiveness”. If 
they are used, they should be related to a standard or there is little effectiveness information. 
CASE STUDY: It is useful to determine and convey those Conditions for which the Time is long 
or short. This is the relation between Time and Conditions shown in the figure by dotted lines. 
A way of presenting the results is by a table. In the following table S and L refer to short and 
long Times and A, B, and D refer to conditions. 
Operational requirements can 
be met for conditions A. 
XJX 
S I A  
acceptable S I A 
times S I A  
L I B process Requirements cannot be met for 
L I B improvement conditions B and D and process 
L I D needed improvement is needed. 
It may be possible from this accumulation of information to unearth cause and effect. The 
results may point toward changes needed to meet requirements for Conditions B and D. If 
changes are made, hrther experimentation would be needed to determine if it works. 
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RESULTS PRESENTATION: How should such results be presented? Consider the following 
parameters for reporting (not an exhaustive set): 
1 .  Average Time most compact least information 
2. Time Extremes two number needed more information 
3. Fraction Meeting Requirement need fiaction and requirement better information 
Each of these is a numerical value that could be called an MOE. Calling the first two MOEs is 
questionable, but a case could be made for the third. In any event, it is obvious that reporting 
any of these numbers by itself leaves out much important information. For this example, it is 
clear that the most important information is Conditions. 
This example leads to several important points: 
A. Data elements can be (should be) specified before an experiment, the same for learning 
objectives, but you may not be able to define MOEs a-priori. One can imagine for this simple 
example that the MOE emerged from the results. 
B. As information is rolled into a smaller number of result parameters information is lost, and it 
may be crucial information. 
C. Most often a result will be a set of information. If an MOE is desired rather than the set, it 
should be developed, and presented, in such a way that it points to the fill set of 
informationhesults that is to be conveyed. 
D. Include with an MOE should be the more detailed information that tells the whole story. In 
the example used here, the information to be conveyed is the Conditions for which requirements 
cadcannot be met. Fraction Meeting Requirement is the logical choice to alert the recipient of 
the results to this information. 
Of course, the above is referred to as a Case Study because the information conveyed is "those 
cases for which.. ." 
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Appendix A. 
THE MODULAR COMMAND AND CONTROL EVALUATION STRUCTURE (MCES) 
The MCES is a general approach to evaluating C3 systems which has been successfully 
applied to a number of issues concerning C3 system planning, acquisition, testing and operation. 
It augments traditional analysis by providing a series of seven steps or modules to evaluate 
alternative C3 systems and architectures. These modules guide analysts who might otherwise 
focus prematurely on the quantitative model rather than the problem definition and the specific 
measures needed to discriminate between alternatives. The seven steps of the MCES are briefly 
described below including the product of each module. 
formal problem statement. The second step is to bound the C3 system involved, by producing a 
complete list of system elements at several levels. The third step is building a dynamic 
framework that identifies the relevant C3 process-a set of functions. These are derived fiom 
the generic control loop (cybernetic) model of C3. The fourth step combines the results of steps 
two and three by integrating the system elements and the process functions into a model or 
representation of the C3 system. The product of this module is at least a complete descriptive 
conceptual model and sometimes a complete mathematical model. The next (fifth) step is to 
specifically idente measures of performance, effectiveness and force effectiveness at the 
corresponding levels of the C3 system and function. The sixth step is to generate results or 
values for these measures by testing, simulation, computational modeling or subjective 
evaluation. Finally, the various measures are aggregated and interpreted in the last step. Each of 
those steps is described as a module below. 
MCES was developed by a team of experts fiom industry, government and academia and was 
endorsed by the Military Operations Research Society. It presents difficult concepts in a 
standardized way that is easily absorbed by both new practitioners and managers. MCES has 
potential for reducing mis-understandings of the purpose and mis-applicability of analytical 
results. This is important when issues of great diversity of nature, size and level of detail are 
being considered, such as in preparation of the Program Objective memoranda (POM). 
Standardization of analytical procedure can be advantageous if based on a comprehensive and 
rigorous methodology such as MCES. MCES can be used for studies ranging fi-om the quick 
conceptual level to the complete quantitative study. It is difficult if not impossible to require a 
complete quantitative study for each issue during a POM cycle, as is required for acquisition 
cycle issues with the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA). But application of 
the MCES at even the conceptual level of analysis may allow better articulation of POM 
tradeoffs. The next section is an exposition of the substance of the MCES. This serves as 
preparation for the required interpretation of the MCES in terms of the MEB C3 problem as 
specified in Task 1.  It will then be followed by application of the MCES to the allocation of 
SINCGARS as also required in Task 1. 
Figure 1. Iteration is an important concept which 
A. Introduction 
The MCES begins by identlflmg the objective of a particular application. This leads to a 
In a new area such as C3, standard language and paradigms are difficult but necessary. The 
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Figure 1. Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure 
prevents “paralysis by analysis.” Iterative refinement of the problem and analysis helps both the 
decision maker and the analyst to prevent studies from being overtaken by events The outputs 
of each step are also shown in Figure 1. Each of the steps or modules is explained below. 
1. Module 1 : Problem Formulation 
as shown in Figure 2. In it the formal decision process (if any), the policy assumptions and the 
scope and depth of analysis are defined. The identification of the full set of decision makers 
being addressed may be necessary. In this module both the appropriate mission and scenario(s) 
are made explicit. The output, a precise statement of the problem, is used in the second module 
to bound the C3 system of interest. 
The objectives of the decision maker(s) posing the problem are identified in terms of the life 
cycle of the C3 system and the level of analysis prescribed. The decision maker’s objectives 
generally reflect the various phases of the life cycle of the C3 system, namely: (1 )  concept 
definition and/or development; (2) design; (3) acquisition; or (4) operations. The appropriate 
B. MCES Modules 
Module 1 describes the decision maker’s objective and the context for a specific C3 problem 
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level of analysis is derived fiom: (1) the mission the system is addressing; (2) the type of system 
itself; (3) the timing, scope and criticality of decision; and (4) the background and commitment 
of the decision maker(s). In this problem formulation step, it is wise to make an initial pass at all 
the MCES steps with the objective of identiflmg the range of likely answers for each module. 
This helps scope the analytical effort as early as possible. 
PROBLEM FORMULATION 
CHARACTERIZE THE DECISION NEED 
DECISIONS BEING SUPPORTED ' 
ANALYSIS REQUIRED 
AS3MPTIONS ABOUT THE PROBLEM 
MISSION \ I  SELECTINlTIAL 
. .  
. .  
~ _ _ ~  
Figure 2. MCES Problem Formulation 











10. What analytical support will be required? Testing? Simulation? 
Who idare the decision maker(s), and how and when will the decisions be made? 
What mission area is involved? Must joint or combined forces be addressed? 
What communities/viewpoints must be addressed for acceptance? 
What are the basic assumptions of the problem? Classification level? Historically how 
has the problem been solved? 
Does the evaluation apply to an individual C3 system or require a comparative evaluation 
of several alternative systems andor forces? 
What threat and scenarios are appropriate and available? 
What part of the life cycle of the C3 system is involved? Time frame? 
What level (system, subsystem, platform, force, etc.) is the analysis focused upon? 
What type of measure, i.e., how quantitative, will answer the decision maker's question? 
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In summary, three steps take place in Module 1 : (1) the decision maker’s needs are 
characterized; (2) the problem’s scope and depth are selected; and (3) the remaining modules are 
previewed for their potential impact on the problem statement and analytical effort required. 
2. Module 2: C3 System Bounding 
Module 2, as described by Figure 3, enumerates the relevant system elements that bound the 
problem of interest. The first goal is to delineate the difference between the system being 
analyzed and its environment. To bound the C3 system, the analyst should employ the three-part 
definition, based upon JCS Publication 1. In it, a C3 system consists of (1) physical entities- 
equipment, software, people and their associated facilities; (2)  structure-aganization, concepts 
of operation, standard operating procedures, and patterns of information flow; and (3) process- 
the hnctionality or “what the system is doing” which is pursued in Step 3. In the second module 
the C3 system, identified by its human, hardware and software entities and structures, is related 
to the forces it controls and the environmental stimuli to which it responds, including the enemy. 
Once the system elements of the problem have been identified, the C3 system of interest may be 
fbrther bounded by relating the “physical entities” and the structure components to the graphic 
representation of the levels of analysis, using the graphic model as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 3. MCES C2 Systems Bounding 
This series of levels is referred to as the “onion skin.” In the most inclusive depiction of this 
graphic, there are five rings. Beyond the outer ring is the rest of the world, which essentially 
relates to elements and structure that exist and may have import with respect to similar problems, 
but which are outside the scope of the problem at hand. In contrast, the outer ring represents the 
environmental factors that require explicit assumptions in the problem. This ring may be seen as 
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including the major scenario components. The next ring, moving inward, deals with the forces 
under influence of the C3 system upon which the evaluation is centered. The C3 system itself is 
the focus of the next ring, and its component subsystems make up the innermost ring. As is clear - 
from the foregoing, this graphic is a structured static display of the physical entities. 
I 
Figure 4. C3 System Bounding and Level of Analysis 
In summary, 1) the C3 system statics must be distinguished from the C3 system dynamics, 
the “C3 process” and its functions. 2) The statics must be be listed as the physical entities 
together with the structural relationships of C3.  3 )  The structure is represented by the customary 
physical arrangement and interrelationships of entities in the form of command structure, the 
standard operating procedures, protocols, message formats and reporting requirements. 
Bounding the C3 system oRen leads to broadening the system of interest. It may be necessary to 
consider the source of information as well as the display that is being decided upon in a 
particular decision. 
3. Module 3: C3 Process Definition 
of the system are identified as noted in Figure 5 .  
After the system is bounded and the system elements identified, the dynamic C3 processes 
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Figure 5. C2 Process Definition 
Module 3 focuses the analyst’s attention on: (1) the environmental “initiator” of the C3 
process, which results from changes in the desired state, usually of enemy forces; (2) the internal 
C3 process hnctions (sense, assess, generate, select, plan, direct); and (3) the input to and output 
from the internal C3 process and the environment. The C3 process hnctions are generic and 
may be adapted to the specific hnctions of air defense, ground operations etc. They can be 
described briefly here as six hnction. 
Sense-the hnction that collects data necessary to describe and forecast the environment, 
which includes: 
(1) The enemy forces, disposition and actions. 
(2) The fiiendly forces, disposition and actions. 
(3) Those aspects of the environment that are common to both forces-for example, 
Assess-the fbnction that transforms data from the sense function into information about 
intentions and capabilities of enemy forces and about capabilities of friendly forces to 
determine if deviation from the desired state warrants hrther action. 
Generate-the function that develops alternative courses of action to correct deviations 
from the desired state. 
Select-the hnction that selects a preferred alternative from among the available options. 
It includes evaluation of each option in terms of criteria necessary to achieve the desired 
state. 
weather, terrain and neutrals. 
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Plan-the hnction that develops implementation details necessary to execute the selected 
course of action. 
Direct-the function that distributes decisions to the forces charged with execution of the 
decision. 
In summz~~y, these six functions have been found to be sufficiently comprehensive to map to 
almost any C3 process. They are applied iteratively. 
4. 
As noted in Figure 6, in Module 4 the relationships between the physical entities and 
structures (defined in Module 2) and the C3 processes or hctions (described in Module 3) are 
&st identified and described-who does what, when. Then techniques such as PERT charts, 
data flow diagrams or 
Module 4: Integration of System Elements and Functions 
INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
PHYSICAL ENTITIES, STRUCTURE 
AND PROCESSES 
DETAILED MODELING OF 
lNPUT/OUTPUT (COUPLING) 
BETWEEN FUNCTIONS 
Figure 6. Integration of System Elements and Functions 
Petri nets may be used to model the messages or information flows that are used to control these 
relationships. Mormation flows support decisions that link the separate C3 fbnctions into the 
architecture containing the relevant C3 system. The term “architecture,’ is used to describe the 
output of module 4 to emphasize the integration via defined interfaces and standards of the 
individual C3 subsystems. The physical entities, structures and fimctions of these individual 
systems are coherently controlled in a dynamic architecture. The architecture might indeed 
become a functioning computer model of the system which would support an evaluation of 
mission effectiveness. The final form of the architecture will at least include the process 
description of the system elements performing the processes arranged in a structural fiamework 
as indicated in Figures 3-4. These may be adequate to support qualitative evaluation of the 
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architecture. A quantitative description of the elements and the inputs to the processes are 
required even if a model cannot be built in the time available. Even these descriptive inputs 
allow an informal assessment on a subjective basis. In summary this module maps Steps 2 and 3 
together and provides quantitative information preferably as a model of the architecture in a 
static and/or dynamic mode. 
5 .  
A C3 measure can usually be categorized as either a performance measure or a vulnerability 
measure. There are generic sets of both of these categories such as the TRI-TAC MOEs shown 
in Table 1 .  These TRI-TAC measures are generic and need additional specification in terms of a 
particular scenario and C3 system. For example, the units of speed of service, interoperability 
and survivability must be identified with reference to the mission and level of the system. 
Module 5: Specification of Measures 




Grade of service 
Information Quality 
Speed of Service 
Call Placement Time 
Service Features 




Ease of Reconfiguration 
Ease of Transition 
Interouerabilitv 
Index of Survivability (Overt) 
Index of Survivability (Jamming) 
Index of Availability 
Interrupt Rate 
Security 
In Module 5 ,  as illustrated in Figure 7, the analyst specifies the measures necessary to 
answer the problem of interest as defined in Module 1 and in the system bounding process and 
integration. The component levels and functions of the C3 system definition modules may be 
examined to derive an initial set of relevant measures, which are then subjected to hrther 
scrutiny: (1) comparison with a set of criteria, Table 2, which may reduce the number to a more 
manageable set; (2) the remaining measures are then classified as to their level of measurement 
(MOFE, MOE, MOP or parameter) which may lead to association of some to a lower level than 
currently of interest; (3) mapping of the MOFE to related MOEs and then to related MOPS, etc., 
and (4) the resulting high level measures are examined for the practicability of measuring 
alternative configurations of the physical entities, structure and/or processes of the C3 system in 
the scenarios defined in Module 1. Practicality often drives measurement down to the level of 
MOE or even MOP because combat oriented measurements are inherently difficult. 
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Relates to force/system mission 
Identified real differences between alternatives 
Can be computed or estimated 
Can be assigned numbers or ranked 







Each of the three levels of the C3 system in the onion-skin diagram is directly related to 
measures of performance (MOPS), measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and measures of force 
effectiveness (MOFEs) as shown in Figure 7. 
Can be defined or derived, independent of subjective opinion 
Relates to acceptable standards and analysis objectives 
Reflects changes in system variables 
Reflects those standards required by the analysis objectives 
Is mutually exclusive with respect to other measures 
Is easily understood by the user 





Figure 7. Specification of Measures 
The determination of the boundary helps to identifl what level of measure is appropriate. If 
the boundary between the force and the environment is of interest, measures of force 
effectiveness (MOFE) are required. Dealing with the boundary between force and the C3 system 
leads to measuring the effectiveness (MOE) of the C3 system. At the subsystem level-that is 
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within the boundary of the system-are measures of performance (MOP) of the functions. 
Finally, within the subsystem are Dimensional Parameters @P). Measures at the higher level, 
MOFEs and MOEs, are most desirable because they are closer to the ultimate purpose of the C3 
system and because they summarize many of the lower level measures in a meaninghl way. 
that is focused on the C3 process fbnctions within the C3 system, the overall performance of the 
C3 system and on the force effectiveness of the C3 system combined with the forces and weapon 
systems, if at all practical. 
In summary, this module’s implementation results in the specification of a set of measures 
6.  Module 6: Data Generation 
by the sixth module. These values are the result of the implementation of this module as noted in 
Figure 8. Here, one of several types of data generators such as exercises, experiments, 
simulations, models or subjective judgement is selected. The MCES accommodates a variety of 
data generators. The prime requirements are that the data generator is: (1) available to the 
analysis; (2) focused on the mission area/analysis objectives of the evaluation; and (3) adaptable 
to produce, with minimal modification, the values associated with the measures specified in the 
previous module. The analyst must consider the following: reproducibility of results, precision 
and accuracy, costs and timing of data collection, environmental controls, and experimental 
design in the final choice of how to generate the values. 
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Figure& DaMSmmsti on 
This step is directly supported by Module 4,&x&qyat ion of elements s&=pecesses. If 
the integration has resulted in a quantitative m d  it+S be straightforward to generate output 
data. The verification of input data fiom modules 2 and 3 and validation of the model must also 
be addressed. Alternatively, if only a conceptual mapping of hnction to structure is 
accomplished in Module 4, the generation of values for measures may be only a qualitative 
comparison table or relative judgmental statements by experienced personnel. 
In the typical implementation, the relationships established in module 4 are translated into 
computer code. In this process it will oRen be necessary to define additional relationships and 
obtain more input data. The validation and verification of this code as a representation of the 
problem must also be addressed. The National Test Bed’s Contidence Assessment Methodology 
is a recommended reference for this step. 
7. 
will be analyzed and interpreted in this module as noted in Figure 9. Because varying scenarios 
may be important for each iteration of the MCES, the analyst must determine the importance of 
each factor. The final module addresses the issue of how to aggregate and interpret the 
measures. Three levels of measurement (performance, effectiveness and force effectiveness) 
with multiple values from each level may be available. The current state of the art requires that 
both qualitative (such as red-yellow-green charts) and quantitative (such as utility weighting) 
aggregation techniques be considered. 
The nature of the problem and available tools determine the mix of these techniques. 
Different problem areas addressing different decision makers’ analytic needs wil result in 
differing requirements for aggregation of constituent measures, but the mappings between levels 
d o w  the decision maker to make an informed decision and understand the reasons for it. The 
issues of measure causality, sufficiency and independence must be considered. The analyst must 
decide if the decision maker’s original queries have been addressed by the MCES analysis. 
Finally, suitable graphics should be prepared for interaction with the decision maker. 
Module 7: APrmegation of Measures 
In Module 6, Data Generation, the analyst obtains values for the specified measures which 
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AGGREGATION OF MEASURES AND 
INTERPRETATION 
SPECIFY I 







Figure 9. Aggregation and Interpretation of Measures 
The implementation of this module provides the analytical results tailored to address the 
problem posed at the beginning of the procedure. The results, made up of the aggregated values 
and measures, should be provided to the decision maker in a format that will expedite his 
consideration of the analysis. Whenever appropriate, graphics are used to summarize and show 
trade-offs. 
Finally the results are provided to the decision maker. Two courses of action are available. 
First, the decision makers may identifjr the need for fbrther iteration. Or they may proceed to 
implement the decision. In most situations, explanation of objectives and the reasoning behind 
the decision help the implementation by lower levels of the organization. MCES is an aid in 
conveying the context, structure and evidence supporting the decision to these levels. 
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Foreword 
The United States Navy purchases millions of dollars worth of major-caliber 
ammunition each year to supply its warships. Combined, U. S. services buy 
hundreds of millions of dollars of ammunition annually. The rounds of 
ammunition are purchased by component, and failure of each component has a 
different effect on the gun system. Thus, establishing component reliability 
thresholds is a complex and important task. We describe the decision process 
for establishing the threshold reliability for components of navy major-caliber 
ammunition. We present a measure of reliability performance, called eP, which 
relates directly to the weapons system's performance in a naval gunfire support 
environment. We use a simulation model to establish this relationship, a 
regression metamodel to estimate its parameters, and a simple decision process 
to specify component reliability thresholds which ensure that the ammunition is 
mission effective. We provide a summary of the data collected between I990 
and 1996. We report the results of analysis and trends of the Marine Corps 
Scenario 6 using the 1991 to 1993 data and then the 1994 to 1996 data. We 
discuss the need for continued data collection, analysis, and the requirements to 
upgrade assessment methodology to conform with High Level Architecture 
guidance and the Major Regional Conflict West Scenario. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Ammunition Working Group, at , 
the request of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane Division, began 
development work on a mathematical model to find the relationship between 
effectiveness (ef) values and battle goals. The goal of the original work was to 
determine minimum reliability thresholds for the components of major caliber . .  gun L 
ammunition with the anticipation that the results would impact program 
management decisions regarding procurement and improvement of gun systems 
com p o nen ts . 
A common belief was that the reliability of each of the round components 
uniquely impacts the effectiveness of the weapon system, and subsequently the 
effectiveness of the battle force. To procure and maintain ammunition that will 
provide adequate utility to naval forces, there must be a clear understanding of 
the relationship between ammunition component reliability and force 
effectiveness. It was further believed that this relationship should guide 
decisions in procurement and surveillance. 
Aside from the immediate ramifications of a failed-round component, that being 
that the round is ineffective, there may also be significant negative effects in the 
continued operation of the gun system. For instance, if a propellant component 
fails, the projectile remains stuck in the gun chamber. If the gun has been firing 
continuously for some time, the gun chamber may be quite hot, thus the 
explosive charge within the stuck projectile becomes a safety hazard. Its removal 
from the gun is a delicate operation that takes a significant amount of time, and 
causes the ship's execution of its mission to be delayed. Other types of round 
component failures cause different negative effects on the ship's performance. 
Thus, any effort to establish ammunition component reliability must take into 
account the complex relationship between the impact of each failure type on 
operational performance. This impact can be measured in terms of system delay. 
In this seminal work, a mathematical model led to the computer Simulation 
used to determine reliabifity thresholds for major caliber gun ammunition. The 
simulation models the action of the 5 inch 54 Mark 45 (MK45) gun systems of 
the battle force, the cycle times associated with the crew performing NGFS 
tasks, the variability of miss distance, the variability of navigation error, and the 
variability of spotting. The simulation uses replications of the gun system to 
represent the ships specified by the study plan. The actions of the Naval Gun 
Fire Support Group are then simulated against the prescribed targets The output 
shows the relationship between ef and the scenario time. 
A decision process was designed that used the simulation to relate the effects 
of the reliability of ammunition components to the performance of the gun 
weapon system in particular, an expeditionary battle force in general and 
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prescribes component reliability thresholds required for that force to meet the 
threat prescribed by policy and doctrine. 
2. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL APPROACH 
We provide a methodology for determining the minimum reliability thresholds for 
components of major-caliber ammunition. We do this by providing the decision 
maker with a functional relationship between component reliability and mission 
performance. By using existing mission performance thresholds, the decision ' 
maker can prescribe minimum component reliability goals. Mission performance 
is measured in two ways for a naval gunfire support (NGFS) mission. 
I. mission time ---- the time required to destroy all of the targets on the 
scenario target list; 
2. average casualty rate ---- the rate of casualties inflicted by the opposition 
during the amphibious assault; 
We modeled the NGFS mission because it employs gun systems in sustained 
operation where the impact of system failure is most acute. The two measures of 
performance above are referred to as baffle goals. The battle goals, also called 
standard performance measures, are those goals specified as indicators of a 
ship's ability to successfully complete an assigned war plan. Mission time or 
Scenario time, the length of time required to neutralize the standard set of 
targets in the specified Amphibious Operations Area (AOA), was used to 
evaluate the reliability goals. Mission time is essential to test the battle force 
mission area capability for Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) because success of 
the theater operations depend on a successful Amphibious operation in a 
restricted time frame. 
-.  
The decision maker is willing to specify the acceptable values for the battle 
goals. Hence, our objective is attained if we can translate performance with 
respect to the battle goals into reliability thresholds. The approach we took is 
illustrated in Figure 1. This structure is similar to some of the hybrid analytic/ 
simulation models with general structures described in Sargent and 
Shanthikumar [9]. What makes this process interesting is that there are an 
infinite number of mixtures of ammunition component reliability which produce 
identical battle goal values. What we strive for is a method of summarizing all of 
the ammunition component reliability data into a single number which represents 
the degree of impact that a particular failure has on the battle goal values as well 






Let us trace through the process shown in Figure 1 for determining reliability 
thresholds for a particular scenario. Starting at the top, we form a list of the gun 
types, the types of ammunition, and the targets used in the scenario. From here, 
we collect data concerning the failure mode and accuracy behavior of the guns 
in the fleet. We construct a planned movement pattern for the ships as they 
engage the targets. Last, we choose values for the reliability of each; component 
of each type of ammunition round used in the scenario. All of these data, . 
including the round reliability, guns, motion, accuracy, and targets, form a set of 
computer files we call the NGFS scenario. This scenario is input into our NGFS 
simulation model, which produces observations of the battle goal values. This is 
described in detail in Section 4. 
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Figure 1 Flow diagram of reliability goal determination 
Simultaneously, the value of the static measure ef is calculated from the gun 
and ammunition reliability values and the system's recovery times. After rep- 
licating the engagement several times and recording the outcome of the battle 
goal observations for a single value of ef, we then manipulate the reliability of 
one or more of the ammunition components and produce another set of battle 
goal observations and another value of e f  This measure and its calculation are 
presented in Section 3. 
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Repeating this process several times, we produce the data to support the 
construction of a metamodel of the battle goal outcomes as a function of ef. 
Finally, we use the metamodel to translate acceptable battle goal values into a 
threshold value for ef, which we call ef:  in Sections 5 and 6, the metamodel and 
its application are described. As we shall see in the next section, ef  is very 
simple to calculate, and depends only on reliability and recovery time data --- no 
scenario is required. We hypothesize that efexplains most of the impact that 
round component reliability have on the system's behavior with respect to battle 
goals. Thus, we have a means of comparing different component reliability 
configurations, as well as specifying component reliability thresholds. 
Furthermore, the functional form of ef combined with the functional form of the 
metarnodel constructed lead us to some interesting conclusions about 
equipment reliability and training levels for naval gun system repairmen. 
3. MEASURING PERFORMANCE WITH EF 
In this section we establish an appropriate performance measure to predict 
variations in the effectiveness of the NGFS system with respect to changes in 
round component reliability. This measure, called ef; is used in the metamodel 
as a predictor of battle goal performance. 
From a system reliability point of view, a round of ammunition is a very simple 
device. It is a series system with a few fuses and charges, along with some sort 
of sensor. The ammunition comes in two pieces: the projectile containing a fuse, 
the sensor, and an explosive charge; and a propelling charge, which launches 
the projectile out of the barrel of the gun. A simple diagram is shown in Figure 2. 
Each of the components of the round must operate successfully for the round to 
operate. Figure 3 shows the flow of energy through those components of 
interest. 
Serial operation causes the observed failure rate of a component in the fleet to 
be different than the defect rate of the component when purchased. To see this, 
suppose that the fuse charge of a round fails to operate. In this case, the burster 
charge of the round is not observed whether if  is defecfive or not. Hence, fuse 
charge failures mask burster charge failures. This same phenomenon causes 
gun failures to mask round failures. 
Let us classify the failures experienced by the gun/round system into N 
categories such that a failure of type Ti causes the gun to stop firing for some 
deterministic time T,,, Let T be measured in time units equal to the time required 
to fire the gun once. The nature of this system allows us to number components 
so that the lower-numbered components take precedence over the higher levels. 
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The defect rates that can be estimated by destructive testing of individual 
components are given by 
x1 = P[failure 1 occurs], 
xi=  P[failure i occurs failure j does not occur, j c i], 
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Figure 2 Five-inch, 54-caliber propelling charge and projectile 
for i = 2, . . ., N. The values of the x’s come from acceptance tests or from 
destructive testing of the round components. The probability that a failure is 
observed in the field is given as 
qi = PEfailure i occurs and failure j does not occur for j < i]. 
Thus, 
for i = 1 , 2, . . ., N. Note that the set of events associated with ql, q2, . . .. g~ are 
mutually exclusive, so that 1 - CiJ I qi is the probability that the gun/ round 
system experiences no failures when fired. 
Let Fi be the number of failures of type i occurring between successful firings 
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T(p) =.lr; [FiTiI +- 1, (2) 
I= 
where 1 is the time required (in the time units used to measure Ti) to fire a round 
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Figure 3 The round as a simple series system. 
Because each round is assumed independent of all others, Fi is a geometric 
random variable with parameter Pi, i = 1, 2, . . ., N. and the Fi are mutually 
independent. Thus, the first two moments of T(p) are given by 
N 
EF(p)l = -$. (Tiqilpi )+ 1 i (3) 
I= 
(4) 
In comparing values of €r (p ) ]  for two different round designs, the round 
design with the smaller € r ( p ) ]  seems better to most reasonable analysts. 
However, it is possible to construct an example where a round has smaller 
€/T(p)] but larger VAR[T(p)]. We discuss the ramifications of this phenomenon 
in a later section. 
We now define our measure of performance of the gun-round system as 
ef = 7 I€[ T(p)]. (5) 
This quantity gives the expected number of successfully fired operational rounds 
per unit time. As we shall demonstrate, simulation results confirm that e f  
represents a good measure of performance of the NGFS system, capable of 
accurately predicting our battle goal performances. 
The functional form of ef provides some interesting insights immediately. We 
can explore the effects of small changes in the failure probabilities or recovery 
times by taking partial derivatives: 
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&f/6E= ( (pi -  I ) I  pi)  eP2 (7) 
The improvements in system reliability realized by incremental improvements 
of component reliability are ordered by the ratio 5 I pi'. If Ti is large and xi is 
large (making Pi small), then this ratio becomes large. Stating that 
often-occurring, long-recovery-time failures are important coincides with our 
intuition, but precisely ordering the components in importance is facilitated by 
the development of ef _ .  
Furthermore, since 0 5 Pi 5 1 and ef  3 0 we know that If & f /  6Tj 5 0. This 
relationship concerns the training of the gun's crew and the design of the failure 
recovery system. We see that the greatest operational payoff per unit of reduced 
recovery time comes from the failure with the lowest Pi. Thus, failures which 
occur most often are most critical, independent of the length of the recovery. 
These two conclusions will be used by our sponsors in making decisions 
regarding design of rounds, training of crews, and granting of bonuses to 
manufacturers who produce exceptionally reliable components. 
Further exploring the relationship between training, component reliability, and 
operational performance, consider a component j which we can either make 
more reliable (i.e., decrease Xj) or make it repairable in less time (i.e., decrease 
Tj). Equating effor two systems, one with better reliability for component j and 
one with shorter repair time for component j, we have 
j - 1  
i = l  
pi + € = 1 - ( X j  + 7) J-J (1 - X i ) ,  (10) 
where 6 is the (negative) increase in repair time, E is the increase in Pj, and is 
the (negative) increase in the defect rate of component j. Solving, we get 
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table 1 presents the results of a simple numerical experiment. We start with a 
baseline system with a component j which has a 1% defect rate, and we 
determine the equivalent repair time reduction for a proposed component which 
has either a 0.1% or 0.8% defect rate, and we do this for components which 
have baseline repair times of 10 and 100 time units. Thus, the top entry tells us 
that if the component is improved so that its defect rate is 0. I%, we are 
providing as much improvement to the system as if we were to reduce the repair 
time from 10.0 time units to about 1.0 time units. Notice that the impact of the 
defect rates of components 1, 2, . . ., j - 1 are minimal here, and that the repair 
time reduction is a constant proportion of the original repair time. 
Table I Tradeoff between improved repair time and improved defect rate. 
.-. . 
1 - n!:; (1 - Pi Y c 6 
10.0 0.99 0.95 0.9405 -0.009 0.00855 - 9.01 
-0.002 0.0019 - 2.02 
0.8 0.992 -0.009 0.0072 -9.01 
-0.002 0.0016 -2.01 
100.0 0.99 0.95 0.9405 -0.009 0.00855 -90.1 
-0.002 0.019 -20.2 
4. THE SIMULATION MODEL 
Our sponsor, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, Crane, 
Indiana, provided us with an NGFS scenario that included fleet composition, 
target types and locations, and deadlines. The simulation we developed inputs 
this scenario, then subjects the targets to realistic prosecution. 
We simulated the spotting procedures used by naval gunners, the allocation of 
targets to ships and guns, the navigational and guidance errors of the correct 
magnitude and probability distribution, the random effects of the rounds' impact 
on the targets, and failures of ammunition, guns, and crew. We modeled realistic 
delays for battle damage assessment, spotting calculations, communication 
transmission, and command decisions. This system was modeled in the 
M 0 D S I M [ 81 o bje c t-o ri e n te d s i mu I at i on p r o g r a mmi n g I a n g u a g e . 
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Data supporting the simulation was of two types, engineering data and tactical 
data. Engineering data includes the frequency of each failure mode and the 
associated recovery time. This data was drawn from the U. S. Navy's Material 
Readiness Database (MRDB) [7]. The logic used in simulating the repair 
process came from Weapons System Fundamentals [lo]. We also require 
damage data for each pairing of ammunition type with target type from the joint 
munitions effectiveness manuals (JMEMs) [4]. The damage model we use takes 
- range from the ship to the target 
- shell type, including fuze type 
- target type 
- range from the point of shell impact to the target's center 
and produces a fraction of expected damage done to the target. As seen in 
Figure 1, all of this data is submitted to the simulation model. A subset of this 
data, the failure probabilities and repair times, are also used to produce ef using 
(2) and (5). 
Required tactical data include all of the information about how the ships in the 
task force behave when prosecuting the targets. The Gunsmoke Manual 123 
provides reasonable ship maneuvering regimes for the target engagements in 
the scenario. Other required data about the engagement was supplied by 
unscientifically surveying numerous surface warfare specialists at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
For the purposes of exposition here, we developed a hypothetical scenario 
involving a small task force of five (5) ships executing preassault engagements 
in a harbor area with twenty-four (24) targets. These targets included an airfield, 
several reinforced command and control bunkers, artillery positions, and troop 
positions on the beach. The preassault phase is supposed to take one full day 
(1440 minutes). The mission includes several counterbattery actions, where a 
ship disengages from its current target and engages a target shooting at the 
ship. The model and data were validated by comparing model outcomes for 
single target engagements with qualification data from the Atlantic Fleet 
Weapons Training Facility (AFWTF), Isle de Vieques, Puerto Rico. This 
comparison was done based on mission times for these single-target 
engagements. 
From each replication of the simulation, we collected the values of the battle 
goals described in Section 2. Let there be W targets in the scenario examined, 
and suppose that fi(t) is the firepower of target i which survives at time f, i = 1, 2, 
. . ., W. The firepower of a target is measured in expected casualties per time 
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. .  
= min t :  f(t) = 0; (15) 
(16) bg(*) = the time-integrated firepower of the surviving targets 
unit. If a target is not a direct combatant, a radar site for example, its firepower is 
estimated as the difference in expected casualties with and without the system. 
Let W 
f ( t )  = c f;.(t) (1 3) 
f = l  
be the total casualty-inflicting capability of the enemy at time t. Our measures of 
performance are 
I 
bg‘” = the time that all of the targets in the scenario are destroyed (14) 
The assault time used in the calculation of bgV) is the time that the troops the 
NGFS is supporting are scheduled to arrive in the target area. This time is given 
in each scenario, and is not allowed to vary with the sample path. That is, the 
troops will arrive on the beach at the required time and are subjected to the 
remaining enemy firepower until it is extinguished. 
, :  
. .. 
5. REGRESSION METAMODELING 
The final steps in the decision process shown in Figure 1 are to estimate the 
functional relationship between ef and the battle goals; and to use thresholds for 
the battle goals to determine the minimum acceptable ef. 
After an initial plot of the BG” vs.l/ef, we concluded that a simple linear 
relationship between BGO’ and 7/ef was plausible. Regression metamodeling is 
the practice of fitting a functional model to the output of a computer simulation, 
see [5]. Figure 4 shows this plot for the time-integrated firepower battle goal 
BG(*). In the case of each battle goal, the regression passed all the usual tests 
for model fit, normality of residuals, and significance of the slope estimate. Some 
points suspected of being leverage points were investigated further and found 
to not influence the regression estimates too much. However, there is an 
observable amount of variation in the responses not explained by ef. The 
sources of this variation are the random effects not encapsulated in ef, namely, 
navigation and guidance errors, focusing and diffusing firepower on the targets, 
effectiveness of rounds against targets, and delays caused by calculation, 
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communication, and command. For this example, w e  estimate the pair of 
regression equations 
1 
ef .. . ?  
bg"' = 45.79 + 41.20 ---, (78) 
1 
ef 
. bg') = 235.36 + 199.95 ---, (19) , 
Figure 5 shows plots of observed battle goals with ef. 
Mean Casualty 
Figure 4 BG") regressed against the value of Ilef 
We now have established the  functional relationship between defect rates in 
ammunition components a n d  battlefield performance. In the next section, we  will 
complete the development of our reliability goal determination process. 
Suppose  the decision maker is willing and authorized to establish that the 
mission described in the  scenario should take no longer than 150 minutes, and 
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that the time-integrated firepower is not acceptable if it is above 860. The reader 
should note that this setting is hypothetical. 
Using the regression result in (18) and (19), we see that the 150-minute 
deadline requires ef to be above 0.40, while the time-integrated firepower of 860 
forces efabove 0.32; ef* = max[0.40, 0.321 = 0.40. In this case, the mission time 
constraint clearly restricted the value of efmore than the casualty constraint. In 
cases where both measures constrain ef to nearly the same degree, the analyst 
must be cognizant of the dependence of BG") and BG(*). A more sophisticated 
linear model which takes this dependence into account should be used. 





Figure 5 Battle goals plotted against ef 
6. DETERMINING RELIABILITY GOALS 
Our threshold is established. We can now say that a gunhound system is 
mission effective, meeting all of the battle goal thresholds, if the calculated value 
of ef is  greater than or equal to 0.40. It may be argued that we are performing 
inverse regression, and should use the upper limit of the inverse confidence 
interval rather than the central value. While this upper limit is readily available, 
we must remind ourselves that the thresholds of the battle goals are set in a very 
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conservative framework, and further conservatism may lead to unattainable 
goals. The decision maker has the upper control limit for ef *at his disposal. 
7. THE SIMULATION MODEL METHODOLOGY IN PRACTICE 
We have developed a measure of reliability performance that reflects the . -_ 
impact of ammunition failures on battlefield performance. We propose that the . 
decision maker make procurement, surveillance, and training decisions based 
on ef* as follows. 
7.1. Procurement 
When contracting for the purchase of ammunition component i, with all other 
components in hand, x; must be small enough so that the overall efof the 
system is above ef: 
The value of increased reliability in a given component can be approximated 
from the ratio (Ti’pi:)eP?, and procurement choices should be made based on cost 
and gain in ef. 
When procuring a new round type, the threshold reliability performance of the 
round should be established using the simulation model, and the incremental 
increase in efshould be measured and compared to the round being replaced. 
7.2. Surveillance 
Upon testing a stockpiled lot of ammunition, if the defect rates of the tested 
components lead to an acceptable value of ef, pronounce the lot mission 
effective. 
If rework must be done, the partial derivatives 6ef I 6pj ; should be used to 
determine the components which will be replaced or repaired. 
If the rework is to be a simple component replacement, the defect rate of the 
replacement component can be substituted for that of the component to be 
replaced. Thus, efcan be determined before the rework action is taken and we 
can determine whether the rework will return the round to mission-effective 
status. 
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7.3. Training, Logistics, and Administration 
Administrators should set threshold recovery times for the different failures 
based on evaluation using ef. Decisions about which spare parts to carry on the 
combatant, which to carry on logistics-support vessels, and which to resupply 
from shore should be based on this analysis. 
Training initiatives should be focused on failures with high values Of (Pi - 7)pi, as 
these failures will deliver the greatest return in terms of effectiveness per unit 
time of recovery time reduction. 
. 
Administrators should evaluate the economic tradeoff of gun crew training 
versus improving ammunition components directly using the methods we used to 
construct Table 1. 
8. ANALYTICAL STUDY 
This section provides the results of analytical studies completed using the 
simulation previously described in this report. These results are based on 
evaluation of data output of the computer simulation of an expeditionary force 
preparing for an amphibious assault in accordance with doctrine and policy in 
effect at the time. The Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs) were 
used wherever possible for ammunition effects data. Ammunition function, miss 
distance, and spotting data collected from the observation post (OP) on Vieques 
Island, Puerto Rico between January 1990 and February 1996 was used. Data 
collected aboard ship between January 1990 and August 1993 was also used to 
develop input parameters. 
. .  
.. . 
The battle goal of mission time or mission duration is shown as a function of an 
input parameter of the simulation. The appropriate values of battle goal 
requirements and known values of the parameter may be applied to aid in the 
management or quality decision process. 
8.1. Scenarios and Threat 
Our sponsor, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, Crane, 
Indiana, provided us with NGFS scenarios that included fleet composition, 
target types and locations, and deadlines. The simulation we developed inputs 
this scenario, then subjects the targets to realistic prosecution. For both the 
1991-1 993 and the 1994-1 996 study the standard marine corps amphibious 
assault western pacific scenario known as MARCOR 6 was used. These plans 
were studied to develop the target list and strike forces as well as the time 
windows of opportunity and time requirements for mission accomplishment. 
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8.2. Data collection 
If the process of analytical study is likened to the human body, certainly the 
simulation is the heart and the data is the blood. The quality of the data I would 
then liken to the oxygen content of the blood. In the case of Navy gun 
ammunition and gun systems we are low on blood and the oxygen content will 
barely keep the patient alive. 
Reliability data on the components of the MK45 gun either are collected directly 
by observation aboard the ship as it is shooting qualifications or it is reported by . 
the ship in the routine of doing maintenance or repair of the system. In the case 
of ship reporting, on the shore side this requires updating of data bases which is -’ 
reliant on funding levels. In the case of the MK45 and 5 inch ammunition many 
times the data for these systems has been left not updated for years. That is why 
this study relies on data by ships observers. Coordination and funding for such 
an endeavor is difficult therefore data is scarce and decision makers must be 
informed and take into account the limits of the analysis. 
During the period January 1990 to August 1993 gun system reliability 
information, powder reliability information, gun cycle time information, and repair 
time information was collected aboard ships performing qualification exercises at 
the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility, Vieques Island. This information 
represents a majority of the input for the NPS simulation. This data was used for 
both analysis since no additional on board data was available for the latter 
period. 
8.3. Gun System Reliability 
The MK45 gun system reliability values that are used in this report are 
generated from the 1289 rounds shot during successful NGFS qualification that 
were monitored by a shipboard observer during the period January 1990 to 
August 1993. They represent those MK45 ships that successfully completed 
their qualification during the time allocated. This sample most closely represents 
the state of readiness of ships deployed and in a mission ready state. At each 
casualty, the ships crew was monitored and the time to repair was recorded. 
The mean time to repair for each of the reliability blocks is the result of the 
collection and aggregation of this data. 
8.4. Powder Charge Reliability 
During 1991 to 1993 , 6871 rounds of ammunition were fired from both MK42 
and MK45 5 inch gun systems. Both HE rounds and Puff rounds were shot. Out 
of these 6871 rounds there were 7 powder casualties. This represents a failure 
rate of .I 02 percent. During 1994 to 1996 3788 rounds were fired during 
qualification during which there were 5 powder casualties. The latter failure rate 
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is .132 percent. Data on powder charge reliability is very good. A failed powder 
almost always results in communication of that fact to the OP. 
MISSION TIME vs POWDER RELIABILITY 
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Powder Reliability in % 
Figure 6 Mission Time vs Powder Reliability 
8.5. Projectile Reliability 
There were 6871 observed HE projectiles shot during I991 to 1993. During that 
period of time 149 duds  and lost rounds were observed. The calculated failure 
rate of 2.169 percent was used as input to the simulation for projectile failure 
rate. For 1994 to 1996 there were 20 of 3877 rounds for a rate of 2528. These 
failures are not as obvious as the powder failure but with astute observers the 
accuracy of this data is very high. With the advent of the high use of GPS in 
navigation and the automation of IV calculation into the fire control system, lost 
rounds are almost always projectile failures rather than training errors. 
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MISSION TIME vs PROJECTILE RELIABILITY 
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Figure 7 Mission Time vs Projectile Reliability 
8.6. Cycle Time 
The cycle time of the gun system is how fast the gun and crew system can 
deliver ordnance on target? It was obvious from the beginning that the gun was 
not used to its Design rate of 20 rounds per minute during NGFS qualification 
exercises. It takes time to get the navigation plot set and spot the gun onto the 
target. This additional time would make ef calculations using the 20 RPM rate as 
the base measurement inaccurate. 
Cycle time is calculated using only those exercises where the action of the gun 
is not timed or constrained in any by the nature of the exercise. The d-day 
exercise, time for spotting rounds , or exercises where the ship is given an 
arbitrary check fire are not used for the calculations. 
Cycle Time is the cumulative time intervals between shots from the first shot of 
an exercise until the last shot of an exercise, divided by the number of intervals. 
Cycle Time is represented by the following equation: 
Cycle Time = Total on-line time intervals 
# of time intervals 
91 
.i . . -. .... 
For the 1991 to 1993 analysis the calculation was 116.6 seconds and for the 
latter analysis it was 89.5 seconds. 
8.7. Spotting Time 
The model was built to use a spotting time when it plays against the scenario of 
targets. The spotting time is defined as the time it takes for the spotters to report 
back to the ship the fall of shot in relation to the intended target. This spotting , 
time is set in the simulation at the average value of those spotting times 
observed and recorded aboard ship. For the sake of these analysis it was a 
constant. 
8.8. Miss Distance 
The numerical values for miss distance used to perform the analysis to generate 
this report was the result of a previously reported study titled Validation of Fall of 
Shot Distribution" dated 15 November 1992. The standard deviation used for the 
azimuth dispersion was 44.92 meters and the standard deviation for the range 
dispersion was 68.14 meters for the 1991 to 1993 These values are based on 
the observation of 423 rounds shot at target number 7 at the Vieques Gun 
Range. For the 1994 to 1996 study a sample of 17 rounds from 3 platforms was 
available for dispersion of 12.91 meters and 20.70 meters respectively. 
In late 1993 the exercises for NGFS qualification were changed. When this 
occurred the use of target #7 decreased to almost nothing. The impact of that 
switch is that there is very little data to validate fall of shot parameters. The use 
of GPS has certainly reduced navigation error and the use of velocimeters has 
also reduced the error budget. It is this improvement in single shot accuracy 
that has enabled the number of spotting rounds to decrease and the cycle time 
to decrease. Limited data however should be taken into account in using this 
analysis. 
8.9. Graphical Results 
To Be Constructed 
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8.10. Trends 
accuracy much better with GPS 
accuracy much better with velocimeter 
reliability better with loss of old ships 
training better with hi tech ways of doing business 
. 
data collection slipping fast _ _  
STATE OF THE ART 
1991 -1 993 1994-1 996 
Sigma x 44.92 12.91 
Sigma y 68.14 20.70 
number of Registration rounds 5 3 
Powder Reliability 99.898 99.868 
Projectile Re1 i ability 97.831 99.472 
- . .  
.. Mission Time in Hours 47.6 19.6 
Mission firing rate .23 .29 
Total mission rounds 3900 2040 
Mission rounds per gun 650 340 
Mission rounds per target 390 204 
8.1 1. Magazine capacity constraints 
The constraints on the amount of ammunition initially in the gun magazine or the 
level of ship fill comes into play for the scenario addressed. If you make the 
assumption however that the battle group will have ammunition replenishment 
ships available for underway replenishment of ammunition then the analysis 
takes this into account quit easily. With the scenario addressed, there would 
occur at most one replenishment per ship. The state of the art in 1994-1996 is 
that 340 rounds per ship would be required. If the capacity did not exceed that 
number, then one hour per gun plus transit time would need to be added to the 
93 
estimated scenario time. in the 1994-1996 study that would increase the 19.6 
hour scenario time to about 28.6 hours. 
9. SUMMARY 
. .  . .. . 
. .  . .  
GPS greatly improved navigation picture 
- 
Velocimeters greatly improved systemic gun errors 
Training seems to have improved cycle times 
Collection of data has slowed to a trickle. 
Collection of data critical to the quality of the studies. 
10. NEEDS 
ship riders and funding to get gun system reliability dat 
complete accurate data sheets  from observers and graders a t  OP 
Updated scenarios to reflect current threat and current requirements 
Next level analytical tools to evaluate integration of other forces and systems in performing a 
coordinated mission. New capabilities of next generation ammo. 
11. MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICT WEST 
The bosses new mission statement. Study must be upgraded to  take it into account for 
requirements. 
Must be done to answer the bosses question, justib budget needs, system needs 
12. HIGH LEVEL ARCHITECTURE 
Mandated standards that all analysis models must meet now or very soon. Model must be 
updated or replaced to meet this. 
13. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Support NSS effort to upgrade the  model and incorporate MRC West. If not NSS then whatever 
HLA compliant model effort that takes its place and is blessed by the  boss 
Get data collection back on track 
94 
14. REFERENCES 
[I] Bailey, M., Bartroli, M., Callahan, A., and Kang, K., Establishing Reliability 
Goals for Naval Major-Caliber Ammunition, Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 39, 
pp. 877-892, 1992. 
[2] Bratley, P., Fox, B., and Schrage, L., A Guide to Simulation (2nd ea.) 
[3] Training and Qualification of Ships in Naval Gunfire and Shore Bombardment 
SpringerVerlag, New York, 1983. 
(Gunsmoke Manual), COMNAVSURFLANTINST 3570.28, August 1989. 
[4] Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (Surface-to-Surface), Effectiveness 
Manual for 5-inchlS4 Naval Single Mount Mk45 with Gun Fire Control System 
Mk86, (Unclassified), Vol. 2, October 1981. 
[5] Kleijnen, J.P.C., Statistical Techniques in Simulation, Part 7, Marcel Dekker, 
Inc., New York, 1975. 
[6] Material Readiness Data Base User’s Manual, Version 777.7, U.S. Navy, 
NWAC, Corona, CA. 
5 .  [7] MODSIM 7 7  Reference Manual, CACl Products Company, LaJolla, CAI 1990. 
[8] Sargent, R.G., and Shanthikumar, J.G., “A Unifying View of Hybrid Simulation/ 
Analytic Models and Modeling, ” Operations Research, 37(6), 1030-1 052 
(1983). 
[9] Weapons Systems Fundamentals, NAVORD OP 3000, Vol. 2, Analysis of 
Weapons, Published at the direction of Commander, Naval Ordnance 



















Data Collection and Analysis Team 
CHENG 
SystemlProcess Developers 
Other Initiative Developers 
Red Team 
War Garners I Simulators 
Others? 
3 


























A #  U 
'1 
V 
H N  * +  c c  















Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis 
n 
I 
a A MOP is a quantitative or qualitative measure 
of a system"s capabilities OP specific 
performance function. (Rates, Ratios, Percenfs) 





Specific: FBE Events are Devised to Provide These Data 
A L 
* RADARMOPs: 
- Average Detection Range of a 2 Square Meter Target 
- False Alarms Rate 
- Ease of Operation of Controls and Displays 
- Mean and Variance of Detection Ranges 
COPSIMOP: Percent of operators judging situational 
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I =New SystemlArchitecture versus Replaced System or 
Arc hitecturs 
- Use Old System as Baseline Using -erirnenf, 
2. - With New SysternlArchitecture versus Without 
SystemlArc hiteeture 
- Measure Performance of an OrganinatSon With the New 
System and Without the Systems (EW RIL) 
- Compare System Performance with a Standard or 
Requirement 
- Least Desirable, due to possible $ME bias, but may be 
only method available 
3. New System versus Predetermined Standard 
4. Evaluate New SystermlArchitecture using SME's 
14 HH 
Institufe for Joint Warfsre Analysis 
Specific Requirements (Easier far comparison) imam 
Time Critical Targeting cycle will be 
initial detection until firing. 
BDA will received by the Battle Watch within 15 minutes 
The Mensuration cycle will be completed within 4 minutes 
The mine neutralization vehicle will have a 90% success 
rate. 
The JFMCC Planning Cycle will be completed within 5 
hours. 
I 0  minutes from 
The COPS will ~csignificantlvs’ enhance Battle Watch 
Situational Awareness ( Problem: How to Evaluate?? 




























































Tact ica I Organ iza t ion 
Doctrine 
Personnel - Ship action 
Weather 
(W-W/O CWC Input) 
Remote, Lantirn, P-3 
Tactically varied IAW with scenario 
S y s tem a t ica I ly varied 
Tactically varied Live, simulated 
Systematically varied IAW Tactics 
System at ically varied 
Held Constant 
System at ically varied 
Held Constant Fleet Specified 
System at ically varied 
Uncontrolled As occurs 
Uncontrolled (Measured) 
RMS, Current, Future 
Minefield not varied 3 types 
Version 2.1, 3.0 
IAW specified Scenario 
As occurs Day and night 
Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis 
Whv Have Pre4JExEeriment Tri,als? 
Allows training of operators and data collectors 





Ensures experiment procedures are efficient and accurate 
Confirms that necessary data is being collected 
Ensures that data collesction does not interfere with system 
operators & experiment realism 
Allaws computer and system shakedown 
Provides an uppartunity to generate a baseline for 
comparative analysis 
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